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ABSTRACT

Khazon, Steve PhD., Industrial/Organizational Psychology and Human Factors, Wright
State University, 2016. Changes in State Suspicion across Time: An Examination of
Dynamic Effects.

State Information Technology (IT) suspicion is the simultaneous action of
uncertainty, mal-intent, and cognitive activity about underlying information that is being
electronically generated, collated, sent, analyzed, or implemented by an external agent
(Bobko, Barelka, & Hirshfield, 2014). Understanding IT suspicion is important in both
military and civilian contexts as both are growing increasingly reliant on automation to
augment human performance (e.g., Lenhart, Purcell, Smith, & Zickuhr, 2010). The
current process model of state IT suspicion describes how suspicion arises and its
immediate correlates. Little is known about how suspicion changes over time and what
factors influence this change. Drawing upon the self-regulation (e.g., Baumeister,
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998) and attention (e.g., Just & Carpenter, 1992)
literatures, I posited that suspicion is a mentally and emotionally demanding state that
cannot be sustained for long periods of time. I used a growth curve modeling approach
(Bliese, 2013) to examine how state IT suspicion changes over time and which factors
influence this change. I found that state suspicion decreases over time and that factors
related to cognitive activity and uncertainty influence the rate at which it changes. I
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discuss implications of my findings for the existing body of knowledge on IT suspicion,
as well as its practical important in military and security contexts.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction and Purpose ................................................................................................. 1
Suspicion in an IT Context ...............................................................................................2
Process Model of Suspicion .............................................................................................6
Extending the Process Model of Suspicion ....................................................................10
How Suspicion Decreases Over Time ............................................................................14
Factors Impacting the End of Suspicion ........................................................................14
II. Method ......................................................................................................................... 23
Participants and Power Analysis ....................................................................................23
Measures.........................................................................................................................23
Materials .........................................................................................................................29
Design and Experimental Manipulations .......................................................................32
Experimental Procedure .................................................................................................34
Analyses .........................................................................................................................35
III. Results ......................................................................................................................... 36
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations ..........................................................................36
Manipulation Check .......................................................................................................37
Growth Modeling ...........................................................................................................38
Building the Level 1 Model ...........................................................................................39
Building the Level 2 Models: Hypothesis Testing .........................................................41
Ancillary Analyses .........................................................................................................47
IV. Discussion ................................................................................................................... 48
Implications for Theory..................................................................................................50
Implications for Practice ................................................................................................57
Limitations .....................................................................................................................59
Future Research ..............................................................................................................64
Conclusion......................................................................................................................66
V. References .................................................................................................................... 68
v

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

1. Correlations, Reliabilities and Descriptive Statistics ......................................................... 83
2. Summary of the Level 1 Growth Curve Model .................................................................. 84
3. Summary of the Cognitive Load Level 2 Model ................................................................ 85
4. Summary of the Creativity Level 2 Model .......................................................................... 86
5. Summary of the General Mental Ability Level 2 Model ................................................... 87
6. Summary of the Need for Cognition Level 2 Model ......................................................... 88
7. Summary of Participant Goals Level 2 Model.................................................................... 89
8. Summary of the Trait Trust Level 2 Model......................................................................... 90
9. Summary of the Trait Suspicion (Self-Report) Level 2 Model ........................................ 91
10. Summary of the Trait Suspicion (Situational-Judgement) Level 2 Model ................... 92
11. Summary of Faith in Humanity Level 2 Model ................................................................ 93
12. Summary of the Cynicism Level 2 Model ........................................................................ 94
13. Summary of the Automation Predictability Level 2 Model ............................................ 95
14. Summary of the Tolerance for Ambiguity Level 2 Model .............................................. 96

vi

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

1. Level 1 Growth Curve Model ....................................................................................... 97
2. Interaction between General Mental Ability and Time on State Suspicion.................. 98
3. Interaction between Need for Cognition and Time on State Suspicion ........................ 99
4. Interaction between Automation Predictability and Time on State Suspicion ........... 100
5. Interaction between Tolerance for Ambiguity and Time on State Suspicion ............. 101

vii

APPENDICIES
Appendix

Page

A: List of Measures ......................................................................................................... 102
B: Dissertation Main Task Instructions .......................................................................... 122
C: List of Main Task Items by Condition ....................................................................... 124
D: Summary of the Workload Level 2 Model ................................................................ 127
E: Summary of the Task Performance Level 2 Model ................................................... 128
F: Interaction between Need for Cognition and Time and time on State Suspicion....... 129
G: Summary of the Time on Task Level 2 Model .......................................................... 130
H: Interaction between Time on Task and Time on State Suspicion .............................. 131
I: State Suspicion Sub-Component Inter-Correlations and Reliabilities ........................ 132
J: State Suspicion Sub-Component Correlations ............................................................ 133

viii

ACKNOLWEDGEMENTS
I thank my advisor, Dr. Nathan Bowling, and my dissertation committee members Drs.
Joseph Lyons, Tamera Schneider, and Gary Burns for their help and support over the
course of my dissertation work. Their wisdom, kindness, technical expertise, and
encouragement were instrumental. Each of them thoughtfully answered my questions,
generously provided guidance, and extended a helping hand over my time in grad school
and throughout my dissertation work.
I also thank my friends and colleagues at the Air Force Research Laboratories Human
Performance Wing. Their support allowed me to get through a large portion of my
graduate work. Their thoughtfulness exposed me to new ideas and ways of thinking,
including the topic I investigate herein.
I thank my girlfriend, Gaal. Her love, support, patience, humor, and wisdom helped me a
great deal throughout the process of completing my dissertation work as well as in life.
Lastly, I thank my parents, Simon and Lana. Their continued support and their faith in me
encouraged me to do my best work.

ix

DEDICATION
To Gaal. Her kindness, style, humor, wisdom about life, and most of all love helped me
in more ways than I can list.

x

Running Head: EXAMINING SUSPICION OVER TIME

I. Introduction and Purpose
Usage of computers and automated systems is ubiquitous in a variety of settings
including education, business, entertainment, and the military. Not only are these
automated systems becoming more indispensable as part of the everyday activities, they
are also becoming more complex and vulnerable to the malign intent of others (e.g.,
Lenhart, Purcell, Smith, & Zickuhr, 2010). In the relatively mundane realm of on-line
shopping, for instance, buyers must be wary of scams and website hosts stealing their
credit card information. Likewise in a specialized military context, an Air Force cyber
operator needs to be on the alert for cyber-attacks that will disrupt the operation of their
system or spy on their activities. For these reasons, understanding the development of
user trust and suspicion within an Information Technology (IT) context is important for
educating users and improving the security of automated systems. While there is a great
deal of research on trust within an automated context (e.g., Lee & See, 2004; Muir,
1994), there are considerably fewer studies on IT suspicion. In particular, there is little
research investigating the dynamic state of suspicion changes while a user considers rival
explanations about the qualities of an automated system (Bobko, Barelka, & Hirshfield,
2014; Fein, 1996).
The goal of the present research is to understand how the processes of being
suspicious changes as people interact with technology and what factors contribute to the
nature and speed of this change. Specifically this study will examine how levels of
suspicion change as people gain more experience with a system and become more
1
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fatigued, as well as how individual differences, such as the general tendency to trust
others, will influence change in suspicion.
Suspicion in an IT Context
Although suspicion is a commonly experienced state that is relevant to many life
domains, the literature on this topic is minimal (Bobko et al., 2014). Most of what exists
is from social psychology (e.g., Echebarria-Echabe, 2010; Fine, 1996; Hilton, Fein, &
Miller, 1993), though researchers from many domains have contributed to the literature.
Examples include marketing (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000), consulting psychology (Buss
& Durkee, 1957), management (Grant & Hofmann, 2011), communication (Buller &
Burgoon, 1996), and human factors psychology (Lyons, Stokes, Eschleman, Alarcon, &
Barelka, 2011). Definitions of suspicion from these domains generally share three
common aspects: uncertainty, perceived mal-intent, and cognitive activity (Bobko et al.,
2014).
Uncertainty refers to a state of suspended judgment about a person, object, or
situation. Lyons and his colleagues, for example, defined suspicion as “the degree of
uncertainty one has when interacting with a particular stimulus” (2011, p. 220; emphasis
added); Grant and Hoffman similarly defined suspicion as “questioning the motives or
the sincerity of behavior” (2011, p. 175; emphasis added). The key element of uncertainty
as it refers to suspicion is that the person who is in a state of uncertainty does not know
enough about the target of suspicion in order to make a prediction about its future state or
behavior. As an example, on-line shoppers who are using a web store that they have
never used before might not know if they are dealing with a reliable vendor. The
shoppers might have certain expectations based on previous experiences with other on-
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line stores, but they do not know if their payment information will be stolen, if their
purchases will be delivered in a timely manner, or if the quality of the products they
receive will match the website’s description.
Perceived mal-intent is the belief that an object, person, or situation might
somehow interfere with one’s goals or otherwise cause one harm. In the Grant and
Hoffman definition above, “questioning the motives or the sincerity of behavior” (2011,
p. 175; emphasis added) implies a lack of honesty on the part of the target might harm the
belief holder. Likewise, Echebarria-Echabe’s definition of suspicion as “the preventive
attitude of receptors towards a message because they think that it contains biased or
hidden interests and involves some attempt at manipulation” (2010, p. 148; emphasis
added) implies that the contents of persuasive messages might contain hidden motives
that serve the interest of the target at the expense of the belief holder. Referring back to
the example of the on-line shoppers, not only is the shoppers uncertain about what might
happen, but they might be cognizant of potential harm to themselves. The shopper’s goal
is to pay the listed price for the exact goods that were described on the website and to
receive them in a timely manner. The on-line retailer’s goal might be to deliver those
goods for the listed price, thus the goals of the shopper and retailer would be aligned.
However, the retailer might also have hidden goals that compete with those of the
shopper. The retailer, for example, might want to generate a larger profit margin, thus
they might deliver inferior goods compared with those listed or sell the shopper’s
personal information to other companies. The retailer might even have a completely
different set of goals from the shopper, such as to steal credit card information.

3
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Cognitive activity in the context of suspicion refers mental effort directed towards
predicting possible motivations, outcomes, or future states while interacting with the
target of suspicion. In Lyons and colleagues’ (2011) definition, the degree of uncertainty
is associated with tension and cognitive processes. Hilton, Fein, and Miller (1993) define
suspicion as questioning motives and “suspend their judgments until they are able to
determine” (p. 504) which alternate future is correct. In the example above, on-line
shoppers do not know for certain what the possible outcomes are when interacting with
the retailer and might believe that the retailer has different goals or attempt to do them
harm, thus shoppers might search for more evidence to attempt to determine how their
interaction with the retailer might end. Shoppers might read reviews of the retailer left by
others or scrutinize the elements of the retailer’s website that triggered their belief of malintent.
Many researchers bring together all three elements into one conceptualization of
suspicion (see Bobko et al., 2014). The most commonly adopted definition from social
psychology is that suspicion is “a dynamic state in which the individual actively
entertains multiple, plausibly rival hypotheses about the motive or genuineness of a
person’s behavior” (Fein, 1996; p. 1165). Likewise, from the communications literature,
Kim and Levine define suspicion as “the degree to which a person is uncertain about the
honesty of some specific communication content thereby stimulating a construal of
motives in an effort to assess potential deceptive intent” (2011, p. 52).
Recently, Bobko et al. (2014) synthesized the suspicion literature and discussed
its implications within IT contexts. These researchers defined state IT suspicion as “a
person’s simultaneous state of cognitive activity, uncertainty, and perceived mal-intent
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about underlying information that is being electronically generated, collated, sent,
analyzed, or implemented by an external agent” (p. 493). Bobko et al. also introduced a
three-stage model of suspicion. In the following sections discuss this model in greater
detail.
Relating suspicion to trust and distrust. The growing suspicion literature exists
alongside the more extensive body of work on trust and distrust. The most highly cited
article on trust (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) defines it as the willingness of a
party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the
other will perform a particular action important to the trustor irrespective of the ability to
monitor or control that other party” (p. 712). Although the research on trust is broad and
spread across several disciplines, the spirit of this definition persists. In a highly cited
trust overview of the trust literature (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998) common
themes of definitions of trust across scholarly domains relate to a willingness to be
vulnerable to others, having a positive expectations of outcomes, and a willingness to rely
on others. When distrust is studied it is typically in relation to trust, and it is defined as
“confident negative expectations regarding another’s conduct” (Lewicki, McAllister, and
Bies, 1998, p. 444). Rousseau et al. (1998) note that there is not yet consensus in existing
research about whether trust and distrust are separate constructs or if they part of the
same continuum, though there is some evidence that trust, distrust, and suspicion are
separate constructs (Lyons el al., 2011).
Taken together, the existing literature on trust and distrust might be distinguished
from state suspicion with regard to the presence of uncertainty about the state of the
system and the intentions of others. Trust involves relatively certain beliefs in others’

5

EXAMINING SUSPICION OVER TIME
good intentions to the degree of the willingness to be vulnerable to them (Mayer, Davis,
& Schoorman, 1995) and distrust is characterized the relatively certain belief in others’ ill
intentions (Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies, 1998). This suggests that people in these
mental states do not have to invest as much effort to monitor others because they believe
they know how others will behave. On the other hand, suspicion involves a state of
ambivalence about the intention of others and constant monitoring of others’ behavior
(Bobko et al., 2014).
Process Model of Suspicion
The three-stage model of IT suspicion proposed by Bobko et al. (2014) is a
process model that addresses how a person enters a state of suspicion and identifies the
immediate outcomes of suspicion. As such, the model is consistent with prior definitions
that describe suspicion as involving a dynamic process (cf. Fein, 1996; Hilton, Fein, &
Miller, 1993). The three stages of the model are: (a) environmental cues, (b) filters (e.g.,
user personality traits), and (c) immediate derivatives and outcomes (e.g., emotional and
cognitive effects).
Stage I: Cues. The first stage (Stage I) of the model involves exposure to cues in
the environment that trigger state suspicion. These cues typically involve a violation of
expectations that signal that potentially malicious activity, leading to an increase in
uncertainty or mal-intent (Bobko et al., 2014). A customer, for example, might notice a
catch in the car salesman’s voice as he describes the merits of a vehicle. An on-line
shopper might observe that a website’s purchasing interface seems more shabbily made
than their previous experience, or that it does not contain a security certificate. Bobko and
colleagues divide IT environment cues into three categories: (a) patterns of negative
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discrepancy, (b) missing information, and (c) system interface characteristics. I review
each of these types of cues below.
Patterns of negative discrepancy. Patterns of negative discrepancy include
witnessing failures in a system across time (Bisantz & Seong, 2001), the reliability of the
hardware or software being used (Lee & Moray, 1992; Lyons et al., 2011), and the
reputation of the system or vendor (Li, Hess, & Valacich, 2008). Generally, these types
of cues increase state-level suspicion by creating a mismatch between what users see and
what they expect (Bobko et al., 2014). Researchers have found, for instance, that users
placed more trust in an automated system that identified threats with an 85% accuracy
than to one that identified them with 65% accuracy (Merritt & Ilgen, 2008). Presumably,
people generally expect technology to be reliable and a 65% accuracy rate violates this
assumption. Likewise, participants who were told that a free legal website was hosted by
a reputable law firm were more likely to hold more trusting belief and depend on the
site’s advice than those who were told nothing (McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar,
2002).
Missing information. Missing information includes the capacity to observe the
performance of the system (Lee & See, 2004), the general transparency of how the
system works and the amount of information people receive (Lyons et al., 2011; Metzger,
Flanagin, & Medders, 2010), and structural assurances that the system will work as
intended (McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2002). This set of cues impacts suspicion
by changing the uncertainty or mal-intent people perceive in the system. Researchers
have found, for instance, that when participants perceived that information was missing
in an environmental policy judgment task, they were more likely to suspect hidden
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motives (Ebenbach & Moore, 2000). Likewise, people are more likely to trust someone
who reveals personal information, such as their name, in the context of interacting in a
virtual community (Ridings, Gefen, & Arinze, 2002).
System interface characteristics. System interface characteristics is a
heterogeneous set of cues that includes the quality and responsiveness of the interface
being used (Burgoon, Blair, & Strom, 2005; Metzger et al., 2010), as well as the
correspondence of the interface to the real environment being simulated (Bisantz &
Seong, 2001). These types of cues impact suspicion by changing the level of uncertainty
and mal-intent that people have while interacting with the system. Researchers have
found that if a product or website fails to meet user expectations about quality with
regard to feel, spelling, and grammar, users tend to believe that it is less reliable (Metzger
et al., 2010). Additionally, researchers have linked system usability characteristics such
faster system response and high quality video displays to increased user trust (Lee & See,
2004; Ridings et al., 2002).
Stage II: Filters. The effects of a given environmental cue are expected to be
influenced by a person’s individual differences (see Stage II; Bobko et al., 2014). How a
person perceives the cue might be influenced by his or her general tendency to trust
others, rely on automation, experience with the environment, or availability of cognitive
resources. Individual differences work as filters to change the impact cues have on the
level of uncertainty, mal-intent, or cognitive activity a person experiences. There are at
least two mechanism by which individual differences could influence state suspicion.
First, they influence how a person interprets an ambiguous cue. Shopper who have
encountered an on-line store that lacks a security certificate, for example, might disregard
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this as an anomaly if they are high in trait trust. Alternatively, shoppers that are low in
trait trust might interpret this same cue as a cause for suspicion. Second, individual
differences could influence whether the shopper notices the cue at all. Shoppers, for
instance, might not notice that the website is not secure due to a lack of experience with
on-line shopping or with computers in general. Additionally, high trait trust might lead to
a disinclination to be attentive to potentially threatening stimuli in the environment. Lowtrust shoppers, on the other hand, may more readily notice such cues.
The research linking suspicion to individual differences is sparse in the existing
literature. What evidence exists is focused around the related and the relatively more
heavily researched trust literature. Specifically, trait trust leads to a reduction in
uncertainty (Lee & See. 2004; Mcknight et al., 2002), which would likely result in a
corresponding decrease in suspicion. Another piece of evidence linking suspicion to
individual differences comes from the attitude change literature. Echebarria-Echabe
(2010) found that need for cognition is related to higher trait suspicion, possibly be
increasing people’s willingness to process information (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). The
question of which individual differences impact suspicion and in what way remains open
to investigation.
Stage III: Immediate Outcomes. Once Stage I cues have filtered-through Stage II
individual differences, a person may experience state suspicion and its immediate
outcomes in Stage III. As I described above, Bobko and colleagues (2014) have
conceptualized suspicion as the joint product of uncertainty, mal-intent, and cognitive
activity. The state of suspicion consists of a person directing cognitive resources in order
to reduce uncertainty. A suspicious person looks for explanations about the behavior of
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his or her environment and attempts to predict what will happen next. This process is
cognitively demanding and emotionally arousing. It takes a considerable amount of
mental effort to maintain the cognitive search inherent to suspicion.
Supporting this view of suspicion as a cognitively taxing state, researchers have
found that when the behavior of a target is left ambiguous but still potentially
disingenuous, respondents spend more time rating their motivations than when the
insincerity of the target’s actions are more clear (Vonk, 1998). The uncertainty and malintent components of suspicion also lead to negative emotions, such as fear and anxiety.
Ambiguous and potentially harmful information about a target’s motivation has been
linked to activation of areas of the brain associated with intense emotions and fear of loss
(Dimoka, 2010). Researchers have suggested that fear and anxiety is a response to a
person’s lack of control or predictability in the situation, while certainty of bad outcomes
typically leads to anger (Huddy & Feldman, 2011). As such, being in a suspicious state is
an emotionally and cognitively taxing experience.
The process model introduced by Bobko et al., (2014) is a good first step towards
understanding how people become suspicious. That model, however, does not address
how people respond to prolonged exposure to suspicion-inducing cues. In the next
section, I will expand on the suspicion process model by describing a theoretical
framework for addressing dynamic effects on suspicion. In short, I posit that suspicion
dissipates with prolonged exposure to suspicion-inducing cues.
Extending the Process Model of Suspicion
The process model of suspicion proposed by Bobko et al. (2014) addresses the
causes, processes, and proximal consequences of state suspicion. An immediate concern

10

EXAMINING SUSPICION OVER TIME
not addressed by this model is what happens after one has reached a state of suspicion.
Bobko et al. (2014) presented suspicion as a discrete ongoing episode; however, they do
not describe how the process continues, changes, and ends. Thus, although it addresses
the initiation of suspicion, as a process model it is incomplete because it does not address
the dynamics that occur after one has become suspicious. In an effort to extend the Bobko
et al. (2014) model, the following section will describe how suspicion might change
across time, as well as when and why suspicion might end.
The state of suspicion is a reaction to uncertainty and possible mal-intent in the
environment that leads to a cognitively demanding search for explanations about the
observed behavior (Bobko et al., 2014). Several literatures have provided evidence that
people have a limited capacity to engage in tasks that require effortful attention for a
prolonged period of time. From the attention literature, the capacity model states that
effortful activities draw upon a common pool of mental resources that can become
depleted with use (Globerson, 1983; Just & Carpenter, 1992; Kahneman, 1973). When
mental resources become depleted, performance on effortful activities will be reduced.
Mental resource exhaustion decreases vigilance (Smit, Eling, & Coenen, 2004), which is
necessary to scan the environment to gather evidence about the target of suspicion. It also
encourages actors to rely on well-rehearsed judgment heuristics (Macrae, Hewstone, &
Griffiths, 1993; Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996), which inhibits the ability to
conduct an effortful search of the environment and generate explanations of behavior that
are critical to a state of suspicion. Human beings are cognitive misers—they prefer to
conserve mental resources, tend to favor decisions based on heuristics, and their ability to
engage in prolonged cognitively demanding activities exhaust their mental resources
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(Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Since a prolonged state of
suspicion consumes mental resources and results in fatigue, the process cannot be
indefinitely sustained.
From the self-control literature, the strength model describes self-regulation as a
limited resource that is depleted as people engage in activities that require self-control, a
process that researchers have labeled ego depletion (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007;
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). In a series of experiments that
provided initial empirical support for ego depletion, Baumeister et al. (1998) found that
resisting eating cookies and being allowed to decide on the type of speech to record
decreased the amount of time that participants spent and number of attempts made on to
solve an unsolvable puzzle. Meta-analytic evidence provides evidence for the robust
influence of ego depleting tasks such as controlling thoughts and emotions, cognitive
processing, and volitional choices on the reduced performance on secondary tasks
(Hagger et al., 2010). These researchers found that activities impacted by ego depletion
include performance on the Stroop Task, handgrip strength, mathematical problem
solving, and performance on anagrams. Low ego strength has also been linked to
overeating, drug abuse, criminality, overspending, and sexual impulsivity (e.g.,
Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Tangney,
Baumeister, & Boone, 2004)
Self-regulatory activities reduce the “reservoir” of available resources available
over time for other tasks. Researchers have found that ego depletion can occur over a
short period; 10 minutes of controlling emotions during a sad movie decreased participant
performance on a solvable puzzle task (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice,
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1998). In a review of the self-control literature, Baumeister, Vohs, and Tice (2007)
observed that activities including controlling thoughts, managing emotions, overcoming
impulses, guiding behaviors, and making choices deplete self-control resources over
time. The state of suspicion includes many activities that deplete self-control resources
such as monitoring the environment and evaluating cues for evidence about possible
future behavior (Bobko et al., 2014), thus people’s attempts to maintain it over time will
result in decreased performance on these activities.
Lastly, in the stress and coping literature (Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus & Folkman,
1984) situational characteristics, such as unpredictability or ambiguity in the
environment, trigger the stress appraisal process. According to the transactional model of
stress and coping (Lazarus, 1991) people give meaning to their environment in two ways:
(a) the primary appraisal which is an assessment of whether a situation constitutes a
threat to their goals or well-being, and (b) the secondary appraisal which is an evaluation
of whether they have the resources to deal with this threat. Those who think they have the
resources to deal with the threat make a challenge appraisal and are more likely to believe
that they will experience positive outcomes from the experience. On the other hand,
people who believe they do not have the resources to deal with the environment make a
threat appraisal, feel overwhelmed, and believe they will experience negative outcomes.
Stress in general, and the threat appraisal of stressors are associated with negative
emotions and decreased performance on cognitive tasks (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984;
Schneider, Rench, Lyons, & Riffle, 2012). State suspicion might trigger or exacerbate the
stress process since situational uncertainty, perceptions of mal-intent, and negative
emotions are its main components (Bobko et al., 2014). Coping with stress taxes self-
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control resources (Hagger et al., 2010), thus further limiting the ability to monitor and
evaluate the environment.
How Suspicion Decreases Over Time
There are several possible reasons why suspicion might decrease as time passes.
State suspicion will decrease if people have made a decision about the behavior and
threat of the environment. Once people believe they have enough evidence to predict the
future behavior of the environment, the uncertainty component of suspicion will cease.
They might instead enter a state of either trust or distrust (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman,
1995; McAllister, 1995), in which they are either willing or unwilling to be vulnerable to
the persons or automated systems in the environment. In this situation people are no
longer suspicious because they lack the necessity and hence motivation to be suspicious.
Another reason suspicion might decrease over time is when people become
fatigued and thus lack the resources necessary to continue the search for more
information about the behavior of the environment (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998;
Kahneman, 1973). This removes the cognitive activity component of suspicion, while
perceptions of uncertainty and mal-intent may still remain. In this scenario suspicion
decreases because people lack the ability to be suspicious.
Hypothesis 1: State suspicion will decrease as time passes.
Factors Impacting the End of Suspicion
Although the ultimate fate of a suspicious state is to decrease over time, the rate at
which it decreases might depend in part upon the situational characteristics and individual
differences of the person experiencing it. According to the process model of suspicion, its
three components act simultaneously (Bobko et al., 2014). If one of the three
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components of the model is absent, the state of suspicion cannot exist. The factors that
influence the rate of change in state suspicion are organized below according to their
congruence with these three components.
Cognitive activity-related factors. Suspicion is characterized in part by a search of
the environment and generating explanations of behavior that requires available mental
resources. As the process of suspicion continues, these mental resources become
consumed, which inhibits one’s ability to engage in effortful processing, including the
activities that comprise state suspicion (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998;
Kahneman, 1973). Bobko and colleagues (2014) have proposed a set of factors that
influence the cognitive component of suspicion. These are detailed below.
Factors that monopolize one’s cognitive resources might inhibit suspicion via its
cognitive activity component (Bobko et al., 2014). Increased mental load on participants
will inhibit their ability to be suspicious by monopolizing the mental and self-regulation
resources that might otherwise have been used to generate explanations of the
environment (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998). A common experimental paradigms that use
self-regulation resources include mathematical calculation, controlling emotions and
thoughts, and social processing (Hagger et al., 2010). Researchers have also used
mathematical tasks as a stressor (e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Schneider, 2004;
Schneider, Rench, Lyons, & Riffle, 2012). For example, Schneider et al., (2012) used a
vocal mental subtraction task in which participants were asked to count aloud backwards
subtracting a constant number each time. Stress taxes self-control resources (Hagger et
al., 2010) and decreases performance on secondary tasks (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984;
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Schneider, Rench, Lyons, & Riffle, 2012), thus inhibiting people’s ability to search the
environment and generating explanations of behavior.
General mental ability refers to a common factor across intelligence tests with
strong links to working memory, information processing, and fluid intelligence (Colom,
Flores-Mendoz, & Rebollo, 2003; Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005). General mental
ability might increase suspicion through facilitating the generation of novel explanations
about the environment. Researchers have found that fluid intelligence buffers the
decrease in self-regulation resources (Shamosh & Gray, 2007), which enables those
higher in the trait to engage in the effortful activities that suspicion requires for longer
periods of time relative to those with low intelligence. Another mechanism through
which intelligence might prolong a person’s ability to remain suspicious is working
memory. Working memory is a system that holds transitory information that people can
manipulate and process (Cowan, 2008). Since finding, judging, and eliminating
alternative explanations of behavior is a necessary competent of suspicion, working
memory is critical for maintaining this state (Bobko et al., 2014). People with high
general mental ability will be able to process information more quickly and for longer
periods of time, thus they will be able to maintain a state of suspicion for longer than a
person with lower mental ability.
Personality-based individual differences related to cognition might also influence
the cognitive activity aspect of suspicion. Researchers have identified creativity and need
for cognition as two such factors that might impact the component (Bobko et al., 2014).
Creative people are able to more easily generate new ideas and novel perspectives on
existing ones (Griffin & Moorhead, 2010). Researchers have found that processing speed
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is linked to creativity, suggesting that high creative people might be experience
prolonged trait suspicion due to its link to mental ability (Dorfman, Martindale,
Gassimova, & Vartanian, 2008). Creativity might increase suspicion across time through
enabling people will also be able to generate more potential explanations of behavior, and
so enhancing their ability to be suspicious.
People who have a high need for cognition tend to structure and understand their
environment (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Researchers have found that people who are
higher in need for cognition tend to seek out new information in a variety of situations.
For example, Skeptical people who are high in need for cognition tend to spend more
time exposing themselves to news sources they do not trust (Tsfati & Cappella, 2005) and
e-consumers high in need for cognition tend to spend more time conducting web searches
about products and websites than those who are low in the trait (Das, Echambadi,
McCardle, & Luckett, 2003). This might facilitate state suspicion by creating a
willingness to engage in a search of the environment. Additionally, people who are high
in need for cognition are better at solving complex cognitive tasks than those low in the
trait (Nair & Ramnarayan, 2000), which may facilitate the cognitive activity aspect of
suspicion. In sum, people who are high in creativity or need for cognition might be more
willing to spend time and effort searching the environment and generating explanations
of ambiguous behavior. These factors will contribute to both the ability and motivation to
engage in a search of the environment and consider its possible futures, thus allowing one
to remain in a prolonged suspicious state.
Hypothesis 2: State suspicion will decrease more slowly as time passes when
cognitive demand is low rather than high.

17

EXAMINING SUSPICION OVER TIME
Hypothesis 3: State suspicion will decrease more slowly as time passes for people
high in creativity than for those who are low.
Hypothesis 4: State suspicion will decrease more slowly as time passes for people
high in general mental ability than for those who are low.
Hypothesis 5: State suspicion will decrease more slowly as time passes for people
high in need for cognition than for those who are low.
Mal-intent-related factors. State suspicion consists in part peoples’ belief that an
entity in the environment wishes to do them harm or impede their goals. The desire to
avoid harm might in part trigger the search of the environment and attempts to explain
behavior (Bobko et al., 2014). In the game theory literature trust is typically studied using
economic games such as the prisoner’s dilemma (e.g., Poundstone, 1992). In a typical
game, two players are placed into a situation in which their goals are both competitive
and collaborative. If one participant betrays the other, the betrayer gains the largest
reward while the betrayed gets the smallest. If both participants place themselves at risk,
both will a get moderate reward. If both participants betray one another they each will get
a small reward. Economic trust games are a useful paradigm to draw upon for
investigating state suspicion. The competitive situations that characterize trust games
create feelings of mal-intent that are a key feature of the suspicion process (Bobko et al.,
2014). Researchers have found that in a competitive situation, people are more likely to
believe that others behave in a self-interested way even if it harms their competitors,
while the reverse is likely to be the case in non-competitive situations (Deutsch, 1960;
Kelley & Stahelski, 1970).
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Individual differences might also impact suspicion through its perceived malintent component. Those differences that are manifested in the tendencies to hold prosocial views of others, such as faith in humanity and trait trust, are likely to facilitate a
faster decrease in state suspicion. Trait trust is “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable
to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a
particular action important to the trustor irrespective of the ability to monitor or control
that other party” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 712). Trait trust might impact how state suspicion
changes through transferring beliefs that others generally have good intentions (Rotter,
1980) onto the suspicion inducing events in the environment. Meta-analytic evidence
suggests that trait trust leads to cooperation across a wide variety of contexts such as
nationality, group size, and situational context (e.g., prisoner’s dilemma; Balliet & Van
Lange, 2013). Faith in humanity is a subcomponent of trust that encompasses general
beliefs in the benevolence, competence, and integrity in human nature (Brown, Poole, &
Rodgers, 2004; McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2002) that was identified by Bobko
and colleagues (2014) as an inhibitor of state suspicion. Both high trait trust and faith in
humanity might make attributions of mal-intent less likely through increasing the
tendency of people to interpret ambiguous events as not being motivated by malice and
by directing one’s attention towards looking for evidence that confirms a truth bias,
which is a tendency to assume a person is truthful regardless of their previous behavior
(Buller & Burgoon, 1996).
Individual differences that lead people to be wary of others and unwilling to be
vulnerable to them, such as trait suspicion and cynicism, might influence the change in
state suspicion through impacting the way people interpret ambiguous cues in the
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environment. People who are high in trait suspicion tend to believe that others will seek
to do them harm and are wary of their motives and beliefs (Buss & Durkee, 1957). People
who are high in general suspicion are more likely to interpret ambiguous cues as reason
for mal-intent. This tendency is more likely if the target of suspicion has done harm in the
past (e.g., McCornack & Levine, 1990; McCornack, Levine, & Solowczuk, 1992). These
findings suggest that those with a suspicious disposition are more likely both to perceive
the ambiguous behavior of the environment as harmful and also to have their beliefs
confirmed if they saw a previous interaction with the target was harmful. Trait suspicion
might start a cycle of wariness that will prolong the state of suspicion. Cynicism is a
disposition towards viewing human behavior to be motivated mostly by self-interest
(Mirvis & Kanter, 1991). Cynicism leads towards interacting with others in a fashion that
results in an environment where cooperation and establishing group goals becomes
difficult, as well as a general mistrust of authority (Mirvis & Kanter, 1989). Cynicism
and trait suspicion might also impact the rate of change in state suspicion through their
association to negative affect and neuroticism (Almada, Zonderman, Shekelle, Dyer,
Daviglus, Costa, & Stamler, 1991; Martin, Watson, & Wan, 2000). Negative affect and
neuroticism have been linked to threat appraisals of stressors, subsequently resulting in
increased cognitive load and a decrease in performance (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984;
Schneider, 2004; Schneider, Rench, Lyons, & Riffle, 2012), which decreases the selfregulation resources available to people (Hagger et al., 2010). Taken together, both trait
suspicion and cynicism might facilitate state suspicion though making ambiguous
environmental cues more threatening and through decreasing the self-regulation
resources available to people.
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Hypothesis 6: State suspicion will decrease more slowly as time passes when
goals are competitive rather than non-competitve.
Hypothesis 7: State suspicion will decrease more quickly as time passes for
people high in trait trust than for those who are low in trait trust.
Hypothesis 8: State suspicion will decrease more slowly as time passes for people
high in trait suspicion than for those who are low in trait suspicion.
Hypothesis 9: State suspicion will decrease more quickly as time passes for
people high in faith in humanity than for those who are low in faith
in humanity.
Hypothesis 10: State suspicion will decrease more slowly as time passes for
people high in cynicism than for those who are low in cynicism.
Uncertainty-related factors. Lastly, state suspicion is characterized in part by
feelings of uncertainty about the behavior of the environment (Bobko et al., 2014).
Factors that contribute to the clarity and predictability of the environment might impact
state suspicion by decreasing the ambiguity about the results and intentions of behavior.
A common paradigm in the used in human factors and trust in automation literature
involves participants monitoring an automated system that contains flaws or provides
inaccurate feedback (e.g., Guznov, Nelson, Lyons, J., Dycus, 2015; Lyons et al., 2011;
Merritt & Ilgen, 2008). Reducing the accuracy of the system provides more instances of
cues that challenge existing beliefs about the behavior of the environment (Bobko et al.,
2014). Researchers have found that witnessing unpredictable patterns of failure in an
automated aide lowers both peoples’ trust in the automation and in reliance upon the aide
(Madhavan, Wiegmann, & Lacson, 2006). Unpredictability of the environment might
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impact that rate at which suspicion changes by challenging existing beliefs about the
environment and generating theories in an attempt to explain the observed behavior.
Researchers have used varying ranges of accuracy for automation monitoring tasks. In
previous research, investigators have manipulated the competence of an automated
advice giver by setting its accuracy to 85% and 65% in the high and low accuracy
conditions respectively (Merritt & Ilgen, 2008). Other researchers have used 95% and
75% accuracy for a reliable and unreliable automation (St. John & Manes, 2002).
Individual difference variables might also impact uncertainty. People with a high
tolerance for ambiguity are more likely to interpret ambiguous situations as nonthreatening and desirable (Budner, 1962). Previous research has found that people who
are more tolerant of ambiguity tend to be less threatened by ambiguously harmful
situations (Laufer & Coombs, 2006) and are less prone to fallacious thinking when under
stress (Giora, 1994). Tolerance for ambiguity might impact change in state suspicion
through the tendency of those high in the trait to be willing to sustain a state of
uncertainty because they find this state less aversive and view the situation as less
threatening compared with a person low in the trait.
Hypothesis 11: State suspicion will decrease more quickly as time passes when
the automation is predictable rather than when it is unpredictable.
Hypothesis 12: State suspicion will decrease more slowly as time passes for
people high in tolerance for ambiguity than for those who are low.
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II. Method
Participants and Power Analysis
I recruited 385 undergraduate psychology students from a large public university in
the Midwest United States to participate in the study. Most of the participants were
female (67.70%) and White (65.90%), with an average age of 20.44 years (SD = 5.08).
Since the study hypotheses involve main effects and cross-level interactions, the latter
of which require both more cases at each level of analysis than does the former, I wanted
to ensure I had both enough participants and enough time points to attain a satisfactory
level of power for my analyses. Researchers recommend at approximately 100
observations at the first level of the model and 10 observations at the second level, in this
case participants and time points respectively, for sufficient power (Hox, 2010). For
longitudinal growth curve modeling, researchers recommend between 6 and 8 time points
for sufficient power (Muthen & Curran, 1997). According analyses conduced on
simulated data, a sample of 300 participants assessed at 7 time points will yield a power
level of about .70, assuming an effect size of .20 (Muthen & Curran, 1997). In the current
study, I aimed to recruit at least 300 participants that would be observed 7 times
throughout the course of the experimental task.
Measures
This study included an assortment of questionnaires to assess the variables of
interest. These questionnaires are described below. For a complete list of items for each
measure see Appendix A.
Creativity. Creativity was assessed using eight items from the International
Personality Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg, 2006). Each item was endorsed on a 7-point scale
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(1 = strongly agree; 7 = strongly disagree). Sample items include “I am able to come up
with new and different ideas,” “I come up with new ways to do things,” and “I don't pride
myself on being original.” High participant scores on this scale are interpreted as being
high in creativity. The scale had satisfactory internal consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha =
.80)
General Mental Ability. Trait level cognitive ability was measured using the short
form of the Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Arthur & Day, 1994; Raven, 1981). The
Raven’s is a nonverbal test of general mental ability in which participants identify
patterns within a set of pictures and select an element to complete the pattern. The short
form contains two practice questions and 12 evaluated questions. Participants had 15
minutes to complete the test. The Raven’s has strong loadings onto Spearman’s g (Paul,
1986), which is strongly linked to working memory (Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2005), a
necessary quality for the cognitive activity component of suspicion. The Raven’s had
somewhat a low internal consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha = .68).
Need for Cognition. Need for cognition was assessed using eighteen items from
the short form of the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). Each
item was endorsed on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly agree; 7 = strongly disagree). Sample
items include “I would prefer complex to simple problems,” “I try to anticipate and avoid
situations where there is likely chance I will have to think in depth about something,” and
“Thinking is not my idea of fun.” High participant scores on this scale are interpreted as
being high in need for cognition. The scale had satisfactory internal consistency
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .87)
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Trait Trust. Trait trust was assessed using eight items from the propensity to trust
subscale (Mayer & Davis, 1999). Each item was endorsed on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly
agree; 5 = strongly disagree). Sample items include “most adults are competent at their
jobs,” “Most experts tell the truth within the limits of their knowledge,” and “One should
be very cautious with strangers.” High participant scores on this scale are interpreted as
being high in trait level trust. The scale had a low internal consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha
= .65).
Trait Suspicion. Trait-level suspicion was measured using nineteen items from the
Suspicion Propensity Scale (SPI; Odle-Dusseau & Bobko, 2015). The measure was
divided into two parts. The first part contained eleven items. Each item is in the form of a
short vignette. Participants endorse how accurately each of four statements describes
them. The statements contain information about levels of trust and suspicion. Total
suspicion is computed by the sum of the “uncertainty and mal-intent” and “uncertainty
and cognitive activity” statements across all of the items. Additionally, trait trust and
paranoia subscales can be computed by the summing the “trust” or the “paranoia” items
respectively. Each item was endorsed on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all accurate, 5 = very
accurate). A sample item for the first part of the SPI is:
Imagine you have applied for a job, for which you are qualified, and have gone
through the interview process. Shortly after the interview, you receive
notification that the company decided to offer the job to another individual.
Based on this situation, please indicate how accurately each of the following
statements describes you:
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a. I would decide to move on and continue searching for a job. (high agreement
indicates trust)
b. I would follow up with someone at the company and request more information
about why I wasn’t chosen. (high agreement indicates uncertainty and cognitive
activity)
c. I would be certain that someone I was in contact with during the process must
not like me, and I would do something such as let others know they should avoid
this company. (high agreement indicates paranoia)
d. I would wonder if there was someone at the company who I had contact with
who purposely wanted to keep me from getting the job. (high agreement indicates
uncertainty and perceived malintent)
The second part of the SPI contained eight items. Each item was endorsed on a 7point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). Sample items include “I often
wonder if salespeople are only interested in their sales commissions,” “I am naturally
suspicious,” and “Most people only tell you what they want you to hear, so they can
manipulate you.” High participant scores on this scale are interpreted as being high in
trait suspicion. The internal consistency for both the situation-based (Cronbach’s Alpha =
.78) and global self-report (Cronbach’s Alpha = .76) were acceptable.
Faith in Humanity. Faith in humanity was assessed using nine items divided into
three subscales: benevolence, competence, and integrity (Li, Hess & Valacich, 2008).
Each item was endorsed on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly agree; 7 = strongly disagree).
Sample items include “most of the time, people care enough to try to be helpful, rather
than just looking out for themselves” (benevolence), “I believe that most professional
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people do a very good job at their work” (competence), and “in general, most folks keep
their promises” (integrity). High participant scores on this scale are interpreted as being
high in faith in humanity. The scale had a satisfactory internal consistency (Cronbach’s
Alpha = .87)
Cynicism. Cynicism was assessed using seven items from Kanter and Mirvis
(1989). Each item was endorsed on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly agree; 7 = strongly
disagree). Sample items include “most people will tell a lie if they can gain by it,”
“people claim to have ethical standards, but few stick to them when money is at stake,”
and “most people are just out for themselves.” High participant scores on this scale are
interpreted as being high in cynicism. The scale had a satisfactory internal consistency
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .82)
Tolerance for Ambiguity. Trait-level tolerance for ambiguity was measured using
ten items from the MSTAT-I (McLain, 1993). Each item was endorsed on a 7-point scale
(1 = strongly agree; 7 = strongly disagree). Sample items include “I enjoy tackling
problems which are complex enough to be ambiguous,” “I prefer familiar situations to
new ones,” and “I avoid situations that are too complicated for me to understand.” High
participant scores on this scale are interpreted as being high in trait tolerance for
ambiguity. The scale had a satisfactory internal consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha = .80)
State Suspicion. State level suspicion was measured using twenty items adapted
from Bobko, Barelka, Hirshfield, and Lyons (2014) Specifically, I modified the scale by
changing the original references to bank customers as targets of suspicion to the
automated aide as the target. Five of the items assess general suspicion (e.g., “I was on
my guard when interacting with the automated aide”) and the rest are divided between its
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three sub facets: six items for mal-intent (e.g., “I felt like I was intentionally being misled
by the automated aide”), five items for uncertainty (e.g., “while interacting with the
automated aide, I was uncertain as to what would eventually happen”), and four items for
cognitive activity (e.g., “I kept thinking that some information I was given by the
automated aide System was unusual”). Each item was endorsed on a 7-point scale (1 =
strongly agree; 7 = strongly disagree). Omnibus suspicion was computed by computing
the sum of all the items in the scale. High participant scores on this scale are interpreted
as being high in the relevant construct. The scale had high internal consistency across all
7 time points (average Cronbach’s Alpha = .94).
Workload. Workload was measured using five items from the NASA TLX
(NASA, 1986). Each item was endorsed on a 7-point scale (1 = very low; 7 = very high).
Sample items included “How mentally demanding was the task,” “How hurried or rushed
was the pace of the task,” and “How hard did you have to work to accomplish your level
of performance.” High participant scores on this scale are interpreted as experiencing
high workload. The scale had a satisfactory internal consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha =
.71).
Task Performance. Performance on the multiplication task, described below, was
computed by summing together all correct responses to the primary task across all 70
items within the 7 main task blocks. Across all condition, the typical participant entered
the correct answer for about 76% of the items (M = 61.77; SD = 6.74).
Manipulation Check. The effect of the experimental manipulations was assessed
using 9 items, 3 for each manipulation. Each item was endorsed on a 7-point scale (1 =
very low; 7 = very high). Cognitive load was assessed using three items: “I found the task
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that I just completed to be stressful,” “I found this task to be very demanding,” and “I felt
as though I was under pressure as I worked on this task.” These items had a satisfactory
internal consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha = .85). Automation quality was assessed with
three questions: “A lot of the time the automated aide seemed to give me bad
information,” “I noticed that the automated aide seemed to give me the wrong answer a
lot of the time,” and “The automated aide seemed to give me relative accurate
information most of the time.” These items had a satisfactory internal consistency
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .86). Perceptions of mal-intent was assessed with three items: “I
thought that one of the other participants tried to hurt my performance on the task,” “I
believe that someone was trying to make the task harder for me,” “I thought that the
people in the room didn’t try to harm my ability to do the task.” These items had a low
internal consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha = .69).
Materials
In order to examine how state suspicion changes across a situation, an
experimental task needs to have several attributes. The task must evoke all three
components of suspicion: mal-intent, uncertainty, and cognitive activity. First, state level
suspicion requires that there be a focal object whose intentions or possible future actions
the person undergoing the state is trying to understand. Many conceptualizations of
suspicion support this notion by containing such a person or entity whose behavior is
being questioned (e.g., Bobko et al., 2014; Fein 1996). The task must create a situation in
which participants believe someone wishes them ill-will and that their goals could be
threatened, thus it will manipulate competitive and cooperation. Researchers using
competitive tasks to study trust and suspicion have found that individually oriented
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competitive goals produce suspicion and undermine trust (Deutsch, 1960; Kelley&
Stahelski, 1970).
Second, in state suspicion the intentions and possible future actions of the target
must be unclear to the actor. The task must create a situation in which the intentions of
others, the state of the system, and possible futures of the environment are uncertain. The
predictability of the automation is a well-established paradigm for examining trust in
automation (e.g., Lee & See, 2004; Merritt & Ilgen, 2008).
Third, the definition of state suspicion requires that the actor invest mental effort
towards attempting gather information about the environment and determining what the
target of suspicion will do. People will invent mental effort when mal-intent, uncertainty,
and the motivation to engage in the task are present. The task must create a situation that
is engaging enough that participants are motivated to do well on the task and challenging
enough that relying on the automated aide is a useful strategy. Since one of the goals of
this research is to examine how state suspicion decreases over time as a result of mental
resource depletion, the task must also be demanding enough to exhaust participants but
not so difficult that it creates a ceiling effect too quickly. Mathematical, memorization,
and time limits tasks are commonly used paradigms in the workload and attention
literature that are mentally challenging and solvable within a laboratory setting (e.g.,
Ferrari, 2001; Liu & Wickens, 1994). These tasks are more cognitively taxing when they
draw from the same pool of resources (Wickens, 1984; Wickens, 2008); thus when both
the primary and secondary tasks are numerical the task as a whole will be mentally
exhausting and facilitate reliance on the automation. To this end, the current study will
include an automation monitoring task in which participants compete for points while
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being assisted by an automated agent with the conceit that another person in the room has
influenced the agent’s properties.
The multiplication task is a mental calculation task. Participants answer a series of
multiplication problems without using any external materials (e.g., calculator, pen and
pencil). Each problem consists of a two digit number multiplied by a one digit number
and participants enter and submit in their answers using a textbox. Participants receive
advice from one automated agent (the “advice giver”) and performance feedback from a
second automated agent (the “question-asking computer”). The question-asking computer
asks participants the multiplication questions and gives them feedback about their
performance. The advice giver suggests an answer to participants. As part of the task,
participants are led to believe that they are in competition for a reward with other
participants in the room and that a random participant has selected the quality of their
advice giver. This is done to create a situation in which feelings of mal-intent,
uncertainty, and cognitive activity are likely to arise. Participants do not actually select
automation quality. All participants receive the same message and experimental
conditions are randomly assigned.
A single item in the multiplication task consists of the “question-asking
computer” presenting a multiplication question (e.g., “64 X 5”) and the “advice giver”
presenting a solution (e.g., “the answer is 485”). The participants’ task is to decide
whether the automated agent gave them the correct answer by selecting one of two radial
buttons. Participants have one minute to make a decision before the task moves on
regardless of whether an answer was selected. This is followed by feedback about
whether they chose the correct answer. The multiplication task consists of 8 blocks of 10
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multiplication problems. The first block was for training and practice and was not scored.
State suspicion was assessed after each regular block using a 20-item measure (Bobko et
al., 2014). Suspicion was measured eight total times: seven times during the task
targeting each block and one state suspicion measure after the task was over targeting the
task overall.
Design and Experimental Manipulations
The study used a 2 (cognitive demand) x 2 (predictability of the automation) x 2
(participant goals) between-subjects design. Multilevel modeling (Hox, 2010) was used
to analyze changes across time, with changes within people at level 1 and stable
individual differences and manipulations at level 2.
Cognitive demand manipulation. The cognitive demand manipulation consisted of
two levels: high demand and low demand. In the high cognitive demand condition,
participants memorized a short list of 5 digits (e.g., “5739218”) before they began each
multiplication problem and were asked to recall them after they answer each question.
Conversely, in the low cognitive demand condition participants were only asked to
complete the multiplication questions with no memorization. The purpose of this
manipulation was to change the cognitive activity component of suspicion. By increasing
the cognitive demand on participants, they will have fewer resources available to dedicate
towards predicting and understanding the environment. Researchers have found that
similar manipulations are cognitively demanding when combined with other tasks
(Brünken, Plass, & Leutner, 2004).
Automation predictability manipulation. The automation predictability
manipulation contained two levels: high predictability and low predictability. The
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purpose of this manipulation was to change the uncertainty component of suspicion. High
levels of predictability will serve to increase the likelihood that a participant will learn
how the system works, thus decreasing uncertainty and leading to a faster decrease in
state suspicion. Conversely, high levels of unpredictability will result in a lower
likelihood that a participant will learn how the system behaves, thus increasing
uncertainty and leading to a slower decrease in state suspicion. There is little agreement
in the literature on ideal rates of automation reliability to evoke trust, suspicion, or
uncertainty. Merritt and Ilgen (2008), for example, recommend rates of 85% for a reliable
automation and 65% for an unreliable automation; Rovira and Parasuraman (2002), on
the other hand, recommend 87% for reliable automation and 57% for unreliable
automation. To ensure that the manipulation was sufficiently strong, the manipulations
varied between extremes of high predictability to high unpredictability. In the high
predictability condition, the automation gave participants the correct answer 90% of the
time (St. Johns & Manes, 2002), while in the low predictability condition the it told
participants the correct answer 60% of the time (Merritt & Ilgen, 2008; St. Johns &
Manes, 2002).
Participant goal manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two
goal types: competitive goals and non-competitive goals. The purpose of this
manipulation was to change the mal-intent component of suspicion. Competitive goals
create an adversarial relationship between participants and as other participants now
represent a threat to one’s chances of winning the reward, thereby increasing perceptions
of mal-intent and leading to a slower decrease in state suspicion. Non-competitive goals,
on the other hand, create a mutually beneficial relationship between participants in which
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each one can help the others have a chance at winning the prize, thus decreasing
perceptions of mal-intent and leading to a faster decrease in state suspicion. In the
competitive condition, participants were told that the person who earns the most points in
the current session will be entered into a drawing to win a prize and they will be
reminded that all other participants in that day’s session are rivals. In the non-competitive
condition, participants were told that everyone who gets at least 80% of the available
points will be entered to win a prize and reminded that everyone in that day’s session will
have a better shot at winning if they choose to help one another and that they can all
succeed together. Meta-analytics evidence suggests that similar goal manipulations
impact group effectiveness and resource sharing (Johnson et al., 1981). Specifically, noncompetitive groups tend to work more closely together than competitive ones.
Experimental Procedure
On-Line Session. Prior to arriving in the lab, participants completed an on-line
consent form and a questionnaire containing the self-reported individual difference
measures (see Appendix A for a complete description of measures). Participants
completed the questionnaire independently and on their own time.
Laboratory Session. After arriving in the lab, participants were directed by the
researcher to sit at one of eight computer stations. The participants then completed the
Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Arthur, 1994; Raven, 1981) and were instructed to wait so
that they could begin the training for the multiplication task as a group. Participants were
randomly assigned into one of the study’s eight conditions. The multiplication task began
with a short description that varied based on the manipulations to which each participant
has been assigned as described above. Importantly, every participant was told that half of
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the participants in the room will decide upon the quality of the “advice giver” agent for
the other half. It should be noted that participants do not actually select the automation
quality of others; instead it serves to facilitate a state of suspicion in participants (see
Appendix B for all of the conditional variations on the task instructions). After the
description, participants began the training, which introduced them to the two automated
agents and included a block of 10 multiplication items representative of the task.
Following the training, participants completed the 7 blocks of the multiplication task as
described above (see Appendix C for a description of all main task items by condition).
Each block consisted of 10 multiplication items and the self-report suspicion measure
(Bobko et al., 2014).
After the main task, participants completed a set of demographic questions and
manipulations checks. Lastly, the participants were debriefed and dismissed.
Analyses
The data were analyzed using multilevel modeling (e.g., Hox, 2010). State
suspicion was the criterion variable. The time-varying covariates (e.g., time parameter)
will be entered into the first level regression equation.
Ytj = β0j + β1j(Ttj) + etj
Where Ytj represents suspicion, β0j represents the intercept, β1j represents the
regression weight, Ttj represents the time parameter, and eij represents the error term. The
subscript t refers to the time point and j refers to the individual participant.
The time-invariant covariates (e.g., individual differences, experimental
manipulations) will be entered into the second level regression equation.
β0j = γ00 + γ01Wj +u0j
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β1j = γ10 + γ11Wj +u1j
Where γt0 represents the intercept of the variable, γt1 represents the regression
weight, Wj represents the time-invariant variable, and utj represents the error term. I
followed the procedures described by Bliese and Ployhart (2002) to evaluate my
hypotheses.
III. Results
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
The descriptive statistics, correlations, and internal-consistency reliability
estimates are reported in Table 1. The pattern of correlations among the individualdifference variables was as expected. Specifically, there were significant relationships
between trait suspicion and trait trust (Self-report: r = -.16, p < .05; Situationaljudgement: r = -.37, p < .01), cynicism (Self-report: r = .32, p < .05; Situationaljudgement: r = .52, p < .01), faith in humanity (Situational-judgement: r = -.13, p < .05),
and creativity (Situational-judgement: r = .15, p < .01) in the expected direction,
providing convergent validity evidence for the Suspicion Propensity Scale (SPI; OdleDusseau & Bobko, 2015).
The patterns of relationships between the outcome variable, state suspicion, and
the other variables was also largely as expected. Suspicion was measured eight times:
seven times during the task targeting each block, and once after the task was completed.
Overall state suspicion had theoretically consistent relationships with general mental
ability (r = .11, p < .05), need for cognition (r = .17, p < .01), trait trust (r = -.16, p < .01),
trait suspicion (Self-report: r = .16, p < .01; Situational-judgement: r = .15, p < .01), and
faith in humanity (r = -.17, p < .01). The patterns of the strength and significance of all
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relationships varied somewhat across the time points, tending to become weaker as time
passed. Three of the variables (need for cognition, trait trust, and faith in humanity) were
related to state suspicion at nearly every instance that participants provided ratings (e.g.,
at least 7 out of 8 times). Three of the variables (GMA and both measures of trait
suspicion) were related to state suspicion on at least half of the occasions (e.g., 4 – 6 out
of 8 times. In sum, these analyses provide some support for the validity of the state
suspicion measures. This is important because little previous research has examined the
validity of either the trait or state suspicion measures.
Manipulation Check
In order to evaluate whether the participants noticed the experimental
manipulations, I conducted an independent samples t-test comparing the means of
responses to the manipulation check items by condition. I found evidence that
participants noticed the cognitive demand manipulation. Specifically those in the high
demand condition rated the task as significantly more mentally taxing than in the low
condition (t(383) = 4.23, p < .05; Cohen’s d =.43). Likewise, participants in the high
automation predictability condition rated the automated agent as being more likely to
give them accurate information than those in the low predictability condition (t(383) =
6.37, p < .05; Cohen’s d =.65). Unfortunately the participants did not seem not notice the
participant goal manipulation. There were no significant differences between participants
in the non-competitive and competitive goal conditions in their perceptions of mal-intent
from the other participants (t(383) = .93, ns; Cohen’s d = .10).
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Growth Modeling
As previously discussed, the goal of the present study is to examine how state
suspicion changes as time passes. Despite being conceptualized as a process (Bobko et
al., 2014), existing research—which has primarily used cross-sectional designs (e.g.,
Echebarria-Echabe, 2010; Lyons el al., 2011)—has not examined state suspicion in a way
that allows this process to be directly examined. The aim of the present study is to
address this research gap by employing multilevel modeling (e.g., Hox, 2010) with a
longitudinal approach (Bliese, 2013) to examine how state suspicion changes within a
situation and what factor influence this rate of change.
A possible reason for the lack of longitudinal studies about state suspicion is their
relative expense in terms of time and resources compared to cross-sectional designs, as
well as possessing a number of methodological considerations that make designing and
examining data for these longitudinal challenging. Three prominent issues, highlighted by
Bliese (2013), include non-independence, autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity of
longitudinal data. That is, survey responses in a longitudinal data set will be more closely
related to each other when they come from the same person and when they are close
together in time. Additionally, the variability of a person’s responses may change as time
passes. These issues violate the assumptions of many statistical techniques, making
analyses difficult. Using multilevel modeling for longitudinal analyses, also called
growth curve modeling, is advantageous because they allow for the non-independence
from assessing participants at multiple time points to be modeled directly. Additionally,
the validity threat posed by autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity can be assuaged by
correcting for them within the multilevel model.
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Following the procedures outlined by Bliese and Ployhart (2002) and Bliese
(2013), I specified the growth model in two stages. During the first stage, I established a
basic growth model for state suspicion. That is, I examined whether there were
significant changes in state suspicion across the 7 time points, whether this rate of change
had a linear or polynomial slope, and if these changes in suspicion varied across
individuals. This Level 1 model served as a baseline upon which I built the Level 2
models that allowed me to test my hypotheses.
During the second stage, I added the time-invariant variables that were directly
related to my hypotheses (e.g., general mental ability and trait trust) to the baseline
model. I created Level 2 models to examine both the direct effects of each variable on
state suspicion, and how it interacted with time to impact the rate of change of state
suspicion.
Building the Level 1 Model
I began by examining whether the variability in participant responses across time
was meaningful or the result of random chance. To test this, I calculated the intraclass
correlation coefficient for state suspicion over time (ICC, Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992).
The ICC For state suspicion was .68 (τ00 = 1.08; σ2 = .51; ICC = τ00/[τ00+ σ2]). This
indicates that 68% of the variability in state suspicion is attributable to the properties of
the individual.
In the first step, I established a baseline model by entering time as a fixed
variable. The time slope was statistically significant and negative (β1j = -.06, p < .01),
indicating that on average state suspicion decreases as time passes.

39

EXAMINING SUSPICION OVER TIME
In the second step, I allowed the intercept of state suspicion to vary among
participants. A significant ANOVA comparing the baseline model to the new one
indicates that I should retain the more complex model and that participants start with
different levels of state suspicion (Δ-2 likelihood = 2035.97, df = 3, p < .01).
In the third step, I added a quadratic and cubic Time slope term to the model in
order to examine if suspicion changes in a curvilinear way as time passes. I found that
both the quadratic (β1j2 = -.02, p < .01) and cubic (β1j3 = .02, p < .01) time slopes were
statistically significant, indicating that they should be retained. The pattern of these
significant slopes indicates that state suspicion changes in a curvilinear way as time
passes: it increases during the beginning of the task, then it decreases, lastly it begins to
increase again or level off.
In the fourth step, I allowed the Time slope to vary across participants. A
significant ANOVA comparing the new model to the previous one indicates that I should
retain the more complex model and suspicion changes at different rates across
participants (Δ-2 likelihood = 487.35, df = 6, p < .01). Allowing the quadratic and cubic
slopes to vary caused the model to fail to converge, thus I did not retain them.
Lastly, in the fifth step, I examined if autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity were
present in the data. Autocorrelation refers to the tendency of time points that are closer
together to be more strongly related to one another than to time points that are further
away. Heteroscedasticity refers to the presence of different levels of variability at
different levels of state suspicion. In order to address these potential sources of error, I
created added correction terms for both into the model. Both the autocorrelation s (Δ-2
likelihood = 161.84, df = 8, p < .01) and heteroscedasticity s (Δ-2 likelihood = 167.55, df
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= 9, p < .01) correction models yielded a significant AONA when compared to the
previous model, indicating that the correction terms should be retained.
The final Level 1 model indicated that suspicion had a curvilinear rate of change
across the 7 time points. Specifically, suspicion increased at the start of the task,
eventually decreasing, until it leveled off towards the end of the task. Establishing that
suspicion changes across time allowed me to examine how time-invariant covariates
interacted with this rate of change. See Table 2 and Figure 1 for a summary of the Level
1 model.
Building the Level 2 Models: Hypothesis Testing
In the previous series of steps, I established a baseline model for examining for
suspicion changes across time. This level 1 model will enable me to evaluate my
hypotheses by adding individual differences and environmental characteristics as level 2
time-invariant covariates of time into the model.
Temporal Changes in Suspicion. Hypothesis 1 states that state suspicion would
decrease as time passes. In order to evaluate this hypothesis I examined the effects of
time on state suspicion within the baseline model. The time slope was statistically
significant and negative (β1j = -.04, p < .01), indicating state suspicion decreases as time
passes. Hypothesis 1 was thus supported. See Table 2 and Figure 1 for a summary of
these results.
Cognitive Demand. Hypothesis 2 states that state suspicion will decrease more
slowly as time passes when the cognitive demand is low rather than high. In order to
evaluate this hypothesis I added cognitive demands as a level 2 variable to the final level
1 model and allowed it to interact with time. There was a significant negative main effect
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between state suspicion and cognitive load (βij = -.20, p < .01). Specifically, state
suspicion was lower when cognitive load was high. This is consistent with the Bobko et
al. (2014) model of suspicion. In order to evaluate if Hypothesis 2 was supported, I
examined the interaction between cognitive demands and time. There were no interaction
between cognitive load and time on state suspicion. Hypothesis 2 was thus not supported.
See Table 3 for a summary of these results.
Creativity. Hypothesis 3 states that state suspicion will decrease more slowly as
time passes for people high in creativity than for those who are low. In order to evaluate
this hypothesis I added creativity as a level 2 variable to the final level 1 model and
allowed it to interact with time. In order to evaluate if Hypothesis 3 was supported, I
examined the interaction between creativity and time. Although creativity had main
effects on state suspicion (βij = -.02, p < .01), it did had no interactions with time.
Hypothesis 3 was thus not supported. See Table 4 for a summary of these results.
General Mental Ability. Hypothesis 4 states that state suspicion will decrease
more slowly as time passes for people high in general mental ability than for those who
are low. In order to evaluate this hypothesis I added GMA as a level 2 variable to the
final level 1 model and allowed it to interact with time. There was a significant positive
main effects for GMA on state suspicion (βij = .05, p < .01). This indicates that state
suspicion increases with GMA. This is consistent with the Bobko et al. (2014) model of
suspicion. In order to evaluate if Hypothesis 4 was supported, I examined the interaction
between GMA and time. There was indeed an interaction between GMA and quadratic
time on state suspicion (βij = -0.01, p < .05). See Table 5 and Figure 2 for a summary of
these results.
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As shown in Figure 2, suspicion initially increased more quickly and decreases
more slowly as time passes among high-GMA participants than among low-GMA
participants Hypothesis 4 was thus supported.
Need for Cognition. Hypothesis 5 states that state suspicion will decrease more
slowly as time passes for people high in need for cognition than for those who are low.
In order to evaluate this hypothesis I added need for cognition as a level 2 variable to the
final level 1 model and allowed it to interact with time. There was a significant positive
main effect of need for cognition on state suspicion (β1j = .19, p < .01). This indicates that
state suspicion tends to be higher for those with a high need for cognition. This is
consistent with the Bobko et al. (2014) model of suspicion. In order to evaluate if
Hypothesis 5 was supported, I examined the interaction between need for cognition and
time. There were significant interactions between need for cognition and the linear (βij =
.30, p < .05), quadratic (βij = -.07, p < .05), and cubic (βij = .01, p < .05) components of
time on state suspicion. See Table 6 and Figure 3 for a summary of these results.
As seen in Figure 3, suspicion increased more quickly initially before it levels off
towards the middle and end of the task, resulting in an overall higher level of suspicion
among high need for cognition participants than those low in the trait. Hypothesis 5 was
thus supported.
Participant Goals. Hypothesis 6 states that state suspicion will decrease more
slowly as time passes when goals are competitive rather than Non-competitive. In order
to evaluate this hypothesis I added participant goals as a level 2 variable to the final level
1 model and allowed it to interact with time. To evaluate if Hypothesis 6 was supported, I
examined the interaction between participant goals and time. There was no main or
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interaction effect of participant goals on state suspicion. Hypothesis 6 was thus not
supported. See Table 7 for a summary of these results.
Trait Trust. Hypothesis 7 states that state suspicion will decrease more quickly as
time passes for people high in trait trust than for those who are low in trait trust. In order
to evaluate this hypothesis I added trait trust as a level 2 variable to the final level 1
model and allowed it to interact with time. There was a significant negative main effect
between state suspicion and trait trust (βij = -.26, p < .01). Specifically, state suspicion
was lower when trait trust was high. This is consistent with the Bobko et al. (2014)
model of suspicion. To evaluate if Hypothesis 7 was supported, I examined the
interaction between trait trust and time. There were no interaction between trait trust and
time on state suspicion. Hypothesis 7 was thus not supported. See Table 8 for a summary
of these results.
Trait Suspicion. Hypothesis 8 states that state suspicion will decrease more slowly
as time passes for people high in trait suspicion than for those who are low in trait
suspicion. In order to evaluate this hypothesis I added trait suspicion as a level 2 variable
to the final level 1 model and allowed it to interact with time. To evaluate if Hypothesis 8
was supported, I examined the interaction between trait suspicion and time. Since I
assessed trait suspicion in two ways--the self-report and situation-based components of
the Suspicion Propensity Index (SPI; Odle-Dusseau & Bobko, 2015)--I examined each in
separate models. There were significant positive main effects between both trait suspicion
measures and state suspicion (Self-report: β1j = .26, p < .01; Situational-judgement: β1j =
.02, p < .01). Specifically, state suspicion was higher when trait suspicion was high. This
is consistent with the Bobko et al. (2014) model of suspicion. There were no interaction
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between trait suspicion and time on state suspicion. Hypothesis 8 was thus not supported.
See Table 9 and 10 for the results for the self-reported and situational-judgement
measures respectively.
Faith in Humanity. Hypothesis 9 states that state suspicion will decrease more
quickly as time passes for people high in faith in humanity than for those who are low in
faith in humanity. In order to evaluate this hypothesis I added faith in humanity as a level
2 variable to the final level 1 model and allowed it to interact with time. There was a
significant negative main effect between state suspicion and faith in humanity (βij = -.18,
p < .01). Specifically, state suspicion was lower when faith in humanity was high. This is
consistent with the Bobko et al. (2014) model of suspicion. To evaluate if Hypothesis 9
was supported, I examined the interaction between faith in humanity and time. There
were no interaction between faith in humanity and time on state suspicion. Hypothesis 9
was thus not supported. See Table 11 for a summary of these results.
Cynicism. Hypothesis 10 states that state suspicion will decrease more slowly as
time passes for people high in cynicism than for those who are low in cynicism. In order
to evaluate this hypothesis I added cynicism as a level 2 variable to the final level 1
model and allowed it to interact with time. There was a significant positive main effect
between state suspicion and cynicism (βij = .13, p < .01). Specifically, state suspicion was
higher when cynicism was high. To evaluate if Hypothesis 10 was supported, I examined
the interaction between cynicism and time. There were no interaction between faith in
humanity and time on state suspicion. Hypothesis 12 was thus not supported. See Table
10 for a summary of these results.
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Automation Predictability. Hypothesis 11 states that state suspicion will decrease
more quickly as time passes when the automation is predictable rather than when it is
unpredictable. In order to evaluate this hypothesis I added automation predictability as a
level 2 variable to the final level 1 model and allowed it to interact with time. There was
no main effect automation predictability on state suspicion. To evaluate if Hypothesis 11
was supported, I examined the interaction between automation predictability and time.
There was a significant interaction between predictability and the cubic components of
time on state suspicion (βij = .01, p < .05). See Table 13 and Figure 4 for a summary of
these results.
As seen in Figure 4, suspicion decreases more quickly towards the end of the task
for participants who had a highly predictable aide than those with low predictability aide.
Hypothesis 11 was thus supported.
Tolerance for Ambiguity. Hypothesis 12 states that state suspicion will decrease
more slowly as time passes for people high in tolerance for ambiguity than for those who
are low. In order to evaluate this hypothesis I added tolerance for ambiguity as a level 2
variable to the final level 1 model and allowed it to interact with time. There was no main
effect of tolerance for ambiguity on state suspicion. To evaluate if Hypothesis 12 was
supported, I examined the interaction between tolerance for ambiguity and time. There
was a significant interaction between tolerance for ambiguity and the linear (βij = .34, p <
.05), quadratic (βij = -.08, p < .05), and cubic (βij = .08, p < .05) components of time on
state suspicion. See Table 14 and Figure 5 for a summary of these results.
As shown in Figure 5, tolerance for ambiguity buffered state suspicion through a
high initial increase in the beginning of the task more quickly before leveling off towards
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the middle of the task for participants high in tolerance for ambiguity than those who
were low in the trait. This effect does not support the hypothesized pattern of state
suspicion decreasing more slowly for those in tolerance for ambiguity. Hypothesis 12
was thus not supported.
Ancillary Analyses
Several variables that are not part of the specific hypotheses of this study are
useful for understanding suspicion. Specifically, these include workload, task
performance, and time spent on the task. These are post-hoc analyses that attempt to
examine whether suspicion is a cognitively demanding process.
Workload. The perceived workload that participants experienced was related to
several theoretically related variables. Specifically, participants who were in the high
cognitive load condition (r = .25, p < .01) and those who performed worse on the task (r
= -.36, p < .01) tended to experience more workload. Additionally, people high in trait
suspicion (r = .16, p < .05) and cynicism (r = .13, p < .05), as well as those who
experienced more state suspicion during the task, tended to have a higher perceived
workload. Workload was also associated with state suspicion during all of the instances it
was measured (r = .28 to .15, p < .05). See Table 1 for a summary of these results.
Additionally, there were significant main effects of workload on state suspicion in the
growth curve model (βij = .24, p < .05), although no significant interactions with time
(See Appendix D). Taken together, these findings suggest that suspicion is a mentally
demanding process.
Task Performance. The number of times that participants correctly judged the
automated aide’s advice was related to several relevant variables. Participants who had
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higher mental ability tended to do better on the task (r = .28, p < .01). Additionally,
people in the low cognitive load condition (r = -.17, p < .01) and those who experienced
lower workload (r = -.36, p < .01) tended to do better. Unexpectedly, task performance
was not related to state suspicion. See Table 1 for a summary of these results. There were
significant main effects for task performance on suspicion (βij = -.17, p < .05), as well as
interactions with the linear component of time (βij = .01, p < .05). See Appendix E and F
for a table and figure depicting these findings. These findings suggest that although those
who performed worse on the task tended to be more suspicious, those who performed
better tended to become suspicious more quickly as time went on.
Time on Task. The amount of time participants spent doing the main task was
associated with several theoretically relevant variables. Participants who were higher in
GMA (r = .29, p < .01) and tolerance for ambiguity (r = .12, p < .05) tended to spend
more time on the task. Those who experienced state suspicion also tended to spend more
time on the task (r = .17 to .14, p < .05). See Table 1 for a summary of these results.
There were also significant main effects (βij = .01, p < .05) and significant interaction
between time on task and the quadratic (βij = .02, p < .05) and cubic (βij = .001, p < .05)
components of time on state suspicion in the growth curve model. See Appendix G and H
for a table and figure depicting these findings. The downward slope for suspicion among
those who took longer on the task suggests that suspicion is a mentally demanding
process.
IV. Discussion
This research is built upon the theoretical framework of state-level IT suspicion
developed by Bobko and colleagues (2014). The work of those researchers introduced a
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theoretical framework for what state suspicion is and how it is evoked. An immediate
concern not addressed by this model is what happens after one has reached a state of
suspicion and how it changes as time passes. The main goal of this research is to expand
upon the process model of state suspicion by describing how suspicion changes within a
situation as time passes, as well as how situational and individual difference factors
impact this rate of change.
My findings generally support the Bobko et al. (2014) model. As expected, I
found that suspicion generally decreased as time passed (Hypothesis 1). Moreover, I
observed that suspicion changed in a polynomial way: it increased at first, decreased
towards the middle of the task, and finally began to increase again as the rate of change
reached a plateau. I also found that several situational and individual difference variables
influenced patterns of change in state suspicion, allowing people with either particular
qualities or situational attributes to maintain suspicion for a longer period of time. These
variables include general mental ability (Hypothesis 4), need for cognition (Hypothesis
5), and automation predictability (Hypothesis 11). Tolerance for ambiguity (Hypothesis
12) buffered the change in suspicion over time, though not in the hypothesized way.
Although nearly all of the remaining situational and individual difference variables had a
main effect on state suspicion, with the exception of creativity (Hypothesis 3) and
participant goals (Hypothesis 6), they did not impact how it changed across time.
Specifically, cognitive demand (Hypothesis 2), creativity (Hypothesis 3), participant
goals (Hypothesis 6), trait trust (Hypothesis 7), trait suspicion (Hypothesis 8), faith in
humanity (Hypothesis 9), and cynicism (Hypothesis 10) did not impact the rate of change
of state suspicion over time, thus the rest of these hypotheses were not supported.
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Implications for Theory
In their overview of the trust and suspicion literature, Kee and Knox (1970) noted
the lack of research about and adequate definitions for both trust and suspicion. Though
the trust literature has grown extensively in the four decades since this review (e.g.,
Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies, 1998; Mayer et al., 1995. Merritt et al., 2013), Bobko et
al. (2014) made the same observation about state suspicion in their own review. The
growth of the scientific understanding of suspicion has been sporadic and its
conceptualizations scattered across several academic domains. Likewise, the definitions
for suspicion have tended to remain specific to the context of several fields of study, such
as communications (Buller & Burgoon, 1996) and marketing (Campbell & Kirmani,
2000), rather than converging across disciplines.
The work of Bobko and his colleagues (2014) advanced the suspicion literature by
creating a multidisciplinary definition of state suspicion and by proposing a model that
described how state suspicion is initiated, and applying that model to the IT context.
Specifically, the model describes how state suspicion is initiated by cues in a people’s
environment (e.g., software that works differently than expected). These triggers are then
either inhibited or catalyzed by people’s individual differences (e.g., their propensity to
believe in the good intentions of others). Finally, if persons are aroused sufficiently, they
will enter a state of suspicion. This state is characterized by feelings of uncertainty about
one’s environment, perceived mal-intent towards a target in that environment, and
cognitive activity acting simultaneously along with their closely proximal correlates (e.g.,
emotional arousal, increased cognitive load, stress indicators). The work of Bobko et al.
(2014) succeeded in synthesizing the existing literature about suspicion into a testable
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dynamic process model that describes the causes, processes, and proximal consequences
of state suspicion.
Evaluating the existing model. The current study advances the scientific
understanding of state suspicion by empirically examining elements of the Bobko et al.
(2014) process model. The results provide evidence supporting the existing model in
several ways. This study found evidence supporting the catalyzing or inhibiting effects of
Stage II filters on state suspicion through a pattern of theoretically consistent correlates
and multi-level effects. With the exception of cynicism, creativity, and tolerance for
ambiguity, all of the individual difference variables showed theoretically consistent
patterns of relationships with state suspicion in over half of the occasions it was
measured. All of the examined variables except participant goals predicted variance in
the starting level of suspicion. The findings for the significant effects for trait trust and
faith in humanity as inhibitors of state suspicion in particular support the predications
made by Bobko et al. (2014). Trust might decrease the likelihood that participants noticed
suspicious cues by creating a trusting stance (Li et al., 2008) that discourages critical
evaluation of the environment’s behavior. There was a similar pattern of effects on state
suspicion in the growth curve model. These findings provide evidence that individual
difference and situational level variables can either inhibit (e.g., trait trust, faith in
humanity, cognitive demand) or catalyze (e.g., trait suspicion, GMA, need for cognition,
and cynicism) the state of suspicion (Bobko et al., 2014).
This study found mixed evidence regarding the structure of suspicion as a
simultaneous state of cognitive activity, uncertainty, and perceived mal-intent (Bobko et
al., 2014). Each of the three components appeared to relate to suspicion at different times.
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The experimental manipulation related to uncertainty, automation accuracy, predicted
change in suspicion throughout the task. A secondary task, the cognitive activity-related
manipulation, predicted the starting level of suspicion. Lastly, the manipulation related to
feelings of mal-intent, whether or not participants had competitive goals, did not predict
suspicion either at the beginning or throughout the task.
There was a similar pattern of findings for the individual difference variables
associated with each of the three components. Those predictors that were associated with
the uncertainty component of suspicion predicted how state suspicion changes across
time (e.g., tolerance for ambiguity). Variables theoretically linked to cognitive activity
tended to predict variation in both the starting level of suspicion (e.g., creativity) and the
change in suspicion over time (e.g., GMA and need for cognition). Lastly, variables that
were related to the mal-intent component of suspicion only predicted the starting level of
state suspicion (e.g., trait trust and cynicism).
Taken together, these findings suggest that the three components of suspicion
impact how the overall state changes in different ways or at different times. While
uncertainty and cognitive activity are present throughout the state of suspicion, mal-intent
appears to be important primarily at the beginning of the state. Rather than acting
simultaneously with the two other components, mal-intent might be influential towards
the early part of the state as a catalyst for the suspicion process. Individual differences
and situational characteristics related to mal-intent might begin the process of suspicion
by incentivizing understanding the behavior of the environment in order to avoid
potential harm (Echebarria-Echabe, 2011). Emotions such as fear, suspicion, and distrust
are associated with the amygdala, which is also responsible for quick activation during
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vigilance against danger (Domika, 2010). The emotions linked to mal-intent, such as
anger and negative affect, are associated with experiencing stress and with threat
appraisals of stressors (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Schneider, Rench, Lyons, & Riffle,
2012). Stress taxes self-control resources (Hagger at al., 2010), and threat appraisals have
been linked to increased cognitive load and worse task performance (Schneider, 2004;
Schneider, Rench, Lyons, & Riffle, 2012). Thus mal-intent might contribute to the selfcontrol resource depletion along with the mental effort of monitoring the environment
(Hagger at al., 2010).
Finally, this study found evidence for the immediate Stage III outcomes (Bobko et
al., 2014). Specifically, participants that experienced higher subjective workload tended
to be more suspicious at the beginning of the task. This supports the current view of
suspicion as cognitively demanding and resource-taxing state (Bobko et al., 2014).
Extending the model. This study advances the existing model of state suspicion by
providing evidence that suspicion is a cognitively demanding process that people cannot
maintain indefinitely. This is the first study to investigate how state IT suspicion changes
during a suspicion-inducing situation. Specifically, throughout the course of the task,
state suspicion had a polynomial rate of change: it increased during the initial part of the
task, followed by a steady decrease and leveling off as time passed. This initial rise in
suspicion might be explained by initial exposure to suspicion cues, followed by a
decrease due to changes in either the motivation or ability to maintain the state.
Moreover, this rate of change is influenced by several situational and individual
difference variables. An emerging theme of these findings is that the change in state
suspicion across time is determined by both people’s ability and motivation to be
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suspicious. Indeed all human behavior can be conceptualized as a function of people’s
ability to do something and their motivation to do it (Vroom, 1964). I examined these
influences through the lens of the three components of suspicion: uncertainty, cognitive
activity, and mal-intent.
The variables that impacted state suspicion’s rate of change were related to two of
its three components: (a) uncertainty-related factors, represented by automation
predictability and tolerance for ambiguity; and (b) cognitive activity-related factors,
represented by general mental ability and need for cognition.
Uncertainty-related indicators. The two indicators of uncertainty had opposite
effects on state suspicion’s rate of change. When participants had a reliable automation,
their level of suspicion spiked during the beginning of the task and rapidly declined as
time passed compared to those whose aide responded more randomly. This pattern is
consistent with existing literature. Specifically, after an initial period of calibration,
human operators develop a strong tendency to trust and rely on their automated assistants
when they are highly reliable (Guznov, Nelson, Lyons, & Dycus, 2015). This provides
evidence that once people can reliably predict the automated agent’s behavior, in effect
removing the uncertainty component of suspicion, they lose the motivation to be
suspicious and adopt trust heuristics that allow them to conserve mental resources
(Kramer, 1999; Vonk, 1998).
Conversely, participants who were high in tolerance for ambiguity tended to
experience rapidly increasing suspicion at the start of the task, catching up with those
who were low in tolerance for ambiguity trait, followed by a slower decline in state
suspicion as time went on. The overall pattern of these findings is congruent with the
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findings that people who are tolerant of ambiguous situations tend to view them as
challenging and interesting (Budner, 1962; Laufer & Coombs, 2006), while those who
are low in the trait tend to view them as aversive and tend to react to them with
suppression or avoidance resulting in quicker judgments (McLain, 1993; Furnham &
Ribchester, 1995). The relative lack of change across time among those low in tolerance
for ambiguity might be attributed to their unwillingness to deal with the unpredictability
in the automation’s behavior, in effect removing the uncertainty component of suspicion
through a lack of motivation to be uncertain. Conversely, the dynamic rate of change and
consistently high level of state suspicion throughout the task among participants high in
tolerance for ambiguity may be explained by their perception of the automated aide’s
behavior as interesting, enhancing their motivation to be uncertain.
Cognitive activity-related indicators. The cognitive activity-related factors
impacted state suspicion’s rate of change in a complimentary way. Participants who were
high in general mental ability tended to start higher in state suspicion and the parabolicshape of its decrease was less steep for them compared to those participants who were
low in the ability. The pattern of these effects supports the notion that suspicion is a
cognitively demanding process that consumes the ego resources required to maintain the
state (Baumeister et al., 1998; Hagger et al., 2010), especially when their attention is
diverted by multiple difficult tasks (Wickens, 1984) as it was in the current study.
General mental ability inhibited state suspicion’s steady decline, perhaps by buffering the
self-regulation resources of those high in the ability (Shamosh & Gray, 2007).
Meanwhile, participants who were high in need for cognition experienced a steady
increase in suspicion during the first part of the task and maintained a higher level of
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suspicion as time passed. The state suspicion of those who were low in the trait tended to
remain flat throughout the task. This pattern is similar to that observed for tolerance for
ambiguity. These findings might be explained by the tendency of those high in need for
cognition to seek out new information when their environment if ambiguous (Cacioppo &
Petty, 1982; Tsfati & Cappella, 2005). Not only do people high in need for cognition
spend more time searching their environment, they also consider more information
simultaneously compared to those low in the trait (Chiou & Yang, 2010), further
facilitating their ability to be suspicious.
Mal-intent-related indicators. Unexpectedly, none of the mal-intent related and
only a few of the cognitive activity-related variables were related to the change in
suspicion across the task. The lack of effects for mal-intent-related variables, like trait
suspicion and faith in humanity, are particularly troubling because believing that one
might be harmed is a critical component of the three simultaneously acting effects that
comprise state suspicion (Bobko et al., 2014). Thus this finding represents a potential
threat to either the construct validity of the process model of state suspicion, the validity
of how mal-intent was operationalized and suspicion was measured, or both. An
alternative possibility is that that the mal-intent related components of suspicion do not
impact its rate of change, but instead only impact if the actor experience suspicion at a
given point in time. For example, people’s level of trait trust might only impact state
suspicion at the Stage II filter-level of the process model, decreasing the likelihood that
they will interpret cues as an anomaly or threat that should be examined further, serving
as a gate to experiencing state suspicion without having any further effects upon how it
changes across time. There is some evidence for this interpretation. Specifically, most of
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the mal-intent related variables (e.g., faith in humanity, cynicism, trait trust, as well as
both measures of trait suspicion) were related to state suspicion in at least some of the
time points where it was measured and had significant main effects in the growth curve
model.
All together these findings represent an attempt to capture the dynamic process of
state suspicion that are central to its conceptualization (Bobko et al., 2014). They both
support the existing model of the construct, as well as advance it by describing how it
changes dynamically throughout a suspicion inducing situation.
Implications for Practice
The results in this study are relevant in at least two sorts of practical
circumstances: (a) situations in which the overall tendency to be suspicious is important,
and (b) situations in which the moment-to-moment change in state suspicion is important.
The first type of circumstance emphasizes the propensity to experience suspicion
when the appropriate cues arise. This will be particularly relevant in circumstances where
an actor’s objectives come into conflict with the aims of others, and when those actors
interact with others through potentially faulty tools (e.g., an automated agent). A specific
example of a circumstance where this might occur is among airport security screeners.
These security agents are entrusted with securing the safety of airline passengers by
examining luggage for potential threats such as guns, knives, or explosive materials.
They most commonly accomplish this task using X-ray imaging devices that produce
multi-colored 2-dimensional scans of luggage, augmented by an automated threat
detection algorithm (Gale, 2005). Meanwhile, the goals of individuals who want to bring
illicit items, such as weapons or drugs, are to circumvent the inspection and to disguise
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these items in such a way as to avoid detection by both the automation and screener.
Visual inspection is a difficult and imperfect process (Gale, Mugglestone, Purdy, &
McClumpha, 2000) and given the number of items that security agents must process
under time constraints lends to increased reliance on the automated aide. Possessing
desirable levels of the Stage II filter traits that facilitate the activation of state suspicion,
such as trait suspicion and need for cognition, would be useful for individuals in this
settings. For instance, being high in trait suspicion might increase the likelihood that
screeners will notice the presence of suspicion cues (e.g., abnormal scan images not
identified by the automation) and enter into an active search for the cause of the cue,
detecting investigating a potential threat that a person low in the trait might dismiss.
Other occupations where this might occur include fraud examiners, retail loss preventions
specialists, benefits eligibility interviews, and law enforcement, as well as military and
cyber warfare contexts.
The second type of circumstance in which these results might be practically useful
includes situations that emphasize a person’s moment-to-moment level of suspicion. Just
as above, these situations feature circumstances where an actor’s objectives come into
conflict with the goals of others. Here however the emphasis is instead on maintaining a
state of suspicion after it arises. Continuing with the baggage screener example, even
after the agent become suspicious how long they remain in the state might be important.
People who possess the uncertainty and cognition-related variables impacted the change
in state suspicion will be able to maintain their level of suspicion for a longer period of
time. For example, screeners that are high in general intelligence can sustain their state of
suspicion for a longer period of time after seeing a suspicion cue compared those who are
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low in the ability. This may actually be detrimental to performance depending upon the
needs of the situation. Security screeners who are high in need for cognition, for instance,
might be motivated to seek and process additional information even under the stringent
time constraints of air travel. This would result in a reduced risk of security breaches, but
also a reduced number of luggage processed over time. Divergent training programs
might benefit both those who tend to remain fairly unresponsive to suspicion cues, as
well as those who tend to spend too long analyzing their environment. Additionally,
special precautions might be required for jobs in which it is important for workers to
maintain a high level of suspicion over an extended period of time. Since suspicion
decreases as time passes, selecting people who possess traits related to maintaining the
state (e.g., GMA, need for cognition) or allowing for period of rest are essential for high
performance.
Limitations
There are at least two threats to the validity of the conclusions of this study: (a)
the quality of the measure of state suspicion, and (b) the quality of the mal-intent
manipulation.
Measuring Suspicion. Participants reported their level of state suspicion using a
20-item self-report measure (Bobko, Barelka, & Hirshfield, 2014). They did this eight
times throughout the task, seven times during the task itself and once afterwards targeting
the task overall. Assessing suspicion eight times was necessary given the transitory
nature state suspicion (Bobko et al., 2014) and the need to observe it at multiple points in
order to achieve adequate power using growth curve modeling (Muthen & Curran, 1997).
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Asking participants the same 20 questions this many times might have at least two
possible drawbacks.
First, repeated measurement of a cue-sensitive state-level construct might elicit
demand characteristic effects from participants (Orne, 1969). Specifically, asking
participants if they are suspicious about what is happening in their environment several
times within a short timespan might suggest to them that suspicion is something they
should be feeling and focusing on. In effect, this would artificially increase participants’
level of suspicion by priming them to be suspicious (Nichols & Maner, 2008). This
would manifest as an increase in state suspicion across time, potentially explaining the
increase observed during the first part of the task. However, the decrease in suspicion
observed towards the end of the task provides evidence that repeatedly asking
participants about their suspicion might not significantly impact their level of state
suspicion.
A second possible issue with the state suspicion measure was that its length and
frequency might have in itself served to deplete the mental resources of the participants.
Previous findings in the ego depletion literature suggest that ego resources deplete
quickly when people engage in most of the activities featured in this experiment,
including completing questionnaires and cognitive tasks (Hagger et al., 2010). Given the
demanding nature of the task, repeatedly assessing state suspicion might have further
depleted participants, in effect decreasing their ability to be suspicious. This would
manifest as a decrease in state suspicion as time passes, potentially explaining the
decrease in state suspicion observed in the later part of the task.
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There are three lines of evidence that support the validity of the results of this
study. First, even if some of the increase in suspicion is explained by confounding
factors, such as demand characteristics, the state still decreased as time passed. The
potentially depleting length of the task does not contradict, but rather augments the
theoretical framework behind the decrease in suspicion. Second, there is a pattern of
theory-consistent correlates between the state suspicion and the other variables measured
in this study, such as trait trust and need for cognition (Bobko et al., 2014; See Table 1).
Thirdly, the change in state suspicion is in part explained by theoretically consistent
variables, such as GMA and tolerance for ambiguity (See Tables 4 and 5). Both the main
patterns of correlations and growth curve effects of theoretically relevant variables on
state suspicion would not be present if the change is suspicion was only due to
methodological artifacts. It is possible that state suspicion might have been at least in part
triggered by priming effects from the questionnaire itself, but this explanation does not
account for the pattern of findings though it might attenuate them.
Understanding Mal-Intent. A second potential threat to the validity of the
conclusions in this study involves the manipulation of mal-intent. I manipulated malintent by randomly assigning participants to receive task instructions that included either
non-competitive or competitive goals. In general, mal-intent appeared to be the weakest
of the three suspicion components. It was the only situational manipulation of suspicion
that participants did not appear to notice, as evidenced by the lack of a significant effect
for the manipulation check items. It was also the only manipulation that was not
significantly related to state suspicion at any of the time points. Furthermore, mal-intent
was the only component of suspicion that did not have at least some of its associated
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Stage II variables (e.g., trait trust) impact the change in suspicion across the time points.
Despite these findings, participants did seem to have experienced perceived mal-intent
during the study. Specifically, participants endorsed the perceived mal-intent items with
about the same frequency and variability as the other suspicion components (See
Appendix I). Additionally, the state level mal-intent component of suspicion (See
Appendix J) has weak to moderate theory-consistent relationships with several of the
Stage II filter variables for at least half of the occasions that mal-intent was measured.
Particularly noteworthy, state mal-intent was consistently related to two of the mal-intentrelated variables, faith in humanity and trait trust, as well as to the manipulation check
items (At least 7 out of 8 occasions it was measured; See Appendix J). Lastly,
participants tended to be more suspicious when the automation was unreliable (5 out of 8
occasions that it was measured; See Appendix J).
Taken together, these results suggest that participants experienced perceived malintent, although it appears to be the weakest of the three components since the mal-intentrelated variables diverged more than the other components from the expected pattern of
findings. This raises questions about both the construct validity of the process model of
state suspicion (Bobko et al., 2014) and about the validity of this study. The reasons for
this pattern of findings might have to do with both difficulties in operationalizing malintent and measuring state suspicion.
First, the mal-intent manipulation might not have been strong enough for
participants to notice. Two parts of the training were designed to induce mal-intent: (a)
task instructions that suggested participants were either competing or cooperating with
one another to win a prize, and (b) procedures design to imply that the quality of each
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participant’s automated aide would be chosen by another participant in the room. The
lack of a significant ANOVA effect between the Non-competitive vs. competitive
conditions and the manipulation check items suggest that this manipulation might have
been too weak. If this is the case, then the variance and predictive power of the mal-intent
scores might be a result of being induced by the Stage I suspicion cues (e.g., false
information given by the automated aide).
Second, the methodological difficulties involved with measuring state suspicion
may have contributed to this unexpected pattern of findings. Specifically, the participants
were induced to feel mal-intent towards the automated aide by directly implying that
another participant in the room had selected its quality for self-gain. This implies a
transfer of suspicion between a target with agency (the rival participant) and the tool with
which they can influence one’s outcomes (the automated aide). However, most of the
state suspicion items (Bobko, Barelka, & Hirshfield, 2014) targeted only the automated
aide. This disconnect between human versus the automation as the target of suspicion
might explain the null results with the mal-intent manipulation check items. That is,
participants anthropomorphized the automated aide and made it the focus of their feelings
of suspicion while largely discounting the earlier background information about the
potential influence of other human actors. This explanation has an unresolved concern
that makes it difficult to accept: An automated aide has no agency with which to feel ill
will towards human participants. It cannot malfunction because it wishes harm to the
others. It can only fail for either for benign reasons (e.g., mechanical error, bugs in the
system) or malicious ones (e.g., sabotage from another participant). Given how readily
people transfer attitudes from a valent object to neutral one (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, &
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Stewart, 2005), it is surprising that feelings of mal-intent did not transfer from the “rival”
participants to the automated aide, or vice versa. The issue of automation agency as it
relates to feelings of perceived mal-intent is an important unresolved issue within the IT
suspicion literature and requires further research.
Future Research
This study provided evidence for state IT suspicion as an ongoing and mentally
taxing process (Bobko et al., 2014) that cannot be maintained indefinitely, and whose
change as time passes is impacted by several situational and individual difference factors.
The IT suspicion literature is still very young and thus offer considerable potential for
new research directions.
Possible directions for future research involve investigating how the extent to
which human operators anthropomorphize the automated systems they use influences
their suspicion of those systems. Based on the existing literature about human-automation
interactions as they pertain to trust, operators anthropomorphize their automated helpers
but they build trust towards humans and machines differently (Madhavan & Wiegmann,
2004). Specifically, human operators tend to approach automated assistants with a perfect
automation schema (Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, & Dawe, 2002) that results in them being
more observant and less forgiving about errors compared with human aides. This
suggests that operators might be more sensitive to Stage I suspicion cues when
interacting with an automated agent than when interacting with other people. State
suspicion and trust differ in several ways. Trust is a consistent attitude of willingness to
be vulnerable to another, while state suspicion is an ongoing process involving the
simultaneous action of perceived mal-intent, uncertainty, and cognitive activity. Trust is a
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mental resource saving schema that people apply after they have gone through the
process of suspicion (see Bobko et al., 2014 for an extensive discussion). The key
difference between trust and suspicion in the context of the current discussion however, is
that trust does not require that the target have autonomous agency. The influence of
malicious others acting upon a non-living object is critical would seem to be a logical
necessity for perceived mal-intent, and thus IT suspicion, to exist. Future research should
explore if and how mal-intent, and suspicion as a whole, is transferred between human
and machine. The issue of whether human operators anthropomorphize machines to the
extent that they can become suspicious of them, as implied by the results of this study,
needs to be clarified in order further strengthen the still relatively young literature on
state IT suspicion.
Another possible direction for future research could use the sequential task
paradigm that is commonly used in the ego depletion literature (see Baumeister et al.,
2007; Hagger et al. 2010). Participants in a sequential task study perform two consecutive
tasks. Researchers manipulate the degree of ego depletion induced within an initial task
(e.g., by asking participants to suppress their emotions while watching emotionallyarousing video clips; see Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998), and measure the impact of
this depletion on performance within a second task. Similarly, future state suspicion
research could adopt this paradigm by asking participants to perform a suspicioninducing activity and subsequently observing if their performance on a different task
suffers. Researchers could likewise examine whether performing an initial ego depleting
task influences one’s suspicion levels during a subsequent task. Using classic ego
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depletion paradigms to examine suspicion would benefit the nascent suspicion literature
by providing more evidence for state suspicion as an ego-depleting process.
A third direction to explore in future research is to more deeply examine the
structure of the state process model of state suspicion and how it changes over time. This
study found evidence that the three components of suspicion were influential at different
times during the task. It is not yet known how being in a state of suspicion influences
earlier stages if the process model. Understanding how being suspicious effects the
interpretation of Stage I cues might provide evidence for a feedback loop for the state that
is critical for understanding how suspicion changes over time. Previous research suggests
that people who are currently suspicious will be more vigilant for potentially harmful
environmental changes. Negative emotions such as anger, suspicion, and fear lead to
increased vigilance and amygdala activation (Domika, 2010). This feedback process
might buffer suspicion over time. The observations made in this study suggest suspicion
might instead drain self-control resources sufficiently to make the accurate observations
and judgements about the environment difficult. Participants tended to experience less
suspicion as time passed and reported increased cognitive load. The emotions associated
with suspicion, such as anger and negative affect, are stressful (Lazarus & Folkman,
1984; Schneider, Rench, Lyons, & Riffle, 2012) and taxing on the self (Hagger et al.,
2010), in addition to the mental demands of the process. Future research can expand upon
the existing model by which of these descriptions of the process if accurate.
Conclusion
The current study advances the scientific understanding of state suspicion by both
providing support for the process model of IT suspicion (Bobko et al., 2014) and
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expanding upon it by demonstrating that suspicion decreases as time passes in part due to
situational influences and individual differences. This is the first study to investigate how
state suspicion changes throughout a suspicion-inducing situation in an IT context using a
growth curve modeling approach. Finally, the current study identifies new construct
validity issues within the state suspicion model that would benefit from future research.
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Table 1
Correlations, Reliabilities and Descriptive Statistics
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Table 2
Summary of the Level 1 Growth Curve Model
Variable
Estimate
SE
df
t value
4.11
.06
2307
70.00
(Intercept)
.24
.06
2307
4.40
Time (linear)
-.11
.02
2307
-5.33
Time (quadratic)
.01
.00
2307
5.11
Time (cubic)
Note. Estimates represent unstandardized coefficients.

p value
.00
.00
.00
.00
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Table 3
Summary of the Cognitive Load Level 2 Model
Estimate
SE
df
Variable
4.11
.06
2306
(Intercept)
.24
.06
2306
Time (linear)
-.11
.02
2306
Time (quadratic)
.01
.00
2306
Time (cubic)
Cognitive Load
-.21
.10
383
.01
.02
2306
Cog. Load X Time (linear)
Note. Estimates represent unstandardized coefficients.

t value
70.00
4.40
-5.33
5.11
-2.11
.86

p value
.00
.00
.00
.00
.03
.38
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Table 4
Summary of the Creativity Level 2 Model
Estimate
SE
df
Variable
(Intercept)
3.51
.30
1970
Time (linear)
.37
.08
1970
Time (quadratic)
-.11
.01
1970
Time (cubic)
.01
.00
1970
Creativity
.12
.06
327
Creativity X Time (linear)
-.02
.01
1970
Note. Estimates represent unstandardized coefficients.

t value
11.61
4.41
-5.86
5.49
2.13
-1.74

p value
.00
.00
.00
.00
.03
.08
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Table 5
Summary of the General Mental Ability Level 2 Model
Variable
Estimate
SE
df
(Intercept)
3.91
.14
2305
Time (linear)
.14
.09
2305
Time (quadratic)
-.08
.02
2305
Time (cubic)
.01
.02
2305
GMA
.03
.02
383
GMA X Time (linear)
.02
.01
2305
GMA X Time (quadratic)
-.01
.00
2305
Note. Estimates represent unstandardized coefficients.

t value
27.22
1.66
-4.08
5.11
1.47
1.56
-2.00

p value
.00
.09
.00
.00
.14
.11
.04
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Table 6
Summary of the Need for Cognition Level 2 Model
Variable
Estimate
SE
(Intercept)
3.55
.35
Time (linear)
-.44
.32
Time (quadratic)
.13
.12
Time (cubic)
-.01
.01
Need for Cog.
.12
.07
Need for Cog. X Time (linear)
.17
.07
Need for Cog. X Time (quadratic)
-.06
.03
Need for Cog. X Time (cubic)
.01
.00
Note. Estimates represent unstandardized coefficients.

df
1980
1980
1980
1980
329
1980
1980
1980

t value
10.04
-1.34
1.16
-1.16
1.61
2.24
-2.20
2.15

p value
.00
.17
.24
.24
.10
.02
.03
.03
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Table 7
Summary of Participant Goals Level 2 Model
Estimate
SE
Variable
(Intercept)
4.11
.07
Time (linear)
.22
.05
Time (quadratic)
-.10
.02
Time (cubic)
.01
.00
Comp. Goals
-.01
.10
Comp. Goals X Time (linear)
.03
.02
Note. Estimates represent unstandardized coefficients.

df
2306
2306
2306
2306
383
2306

t value
53.30
4.01
-5.33
5.11
-.01
1.73

p value
.00
.00
.00
.00
.93
.08
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Table 8
Summary of the Trait Trust Level 2 Model
Variable
Estimate
SE
df
(Intercept)
5.10
.27
1886
Time (linear)
.25
.06
1886
Time (quadratic)
-.11
.02
1886
Time (cubic)
.01
.00
1886
Trait Trust
-.26
.07
313
Trait Trust X Time (linear)
.01
.02
1886
Note. Estimates represent unstandardized coefficients.

t value
18.52
4.09
-5.01
4.85
-3.66
.86

p value
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.38
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Table 9
Summary of the Trait Suspicion (Self-Report) Level 2 Model
Variable
Estimate
SE
df
(Intercept)
2.87
.27
1928
Time (linear)
.24
.05
1928
Time (quadratic)
-.11
.02
1928
Time (cubic)
.01
.00
1928
Trait Suspicion – Self-Report
.26
.06
32
Trait Suspicion – SR X Time
-.02
.01
1928
Note. Estimates represent unstandardized coefficients.

t value
10.31
4.63
-5.34
4.91
4.54
-1.92

p value
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.05
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Table 10
Summary of the Trait Suspicion (Situational-Judgement) Level 2 Model
Variable
Estimate
SE
df
(Intercept)
3.03
.31
1928
Time (linear)
.32
.05
1928
Time (quadratic)
-.13
.02
1928
Time (cubic)
.01
.00
1928
Trait Suspicion – Situational-Judgement
.01
.00
320
Suspicion – SJ X Time
.00
.00
1928
Note. Estimates represent unstandardized coefficients.

t value
9.52
5.91
-6.19
5.57
3.22
-.13

p value
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.88
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Table 11
Summary of Faith in Humanity Level 2 Model
Variable
Estimate
SE
df
(Intercept)
4.98
.28
1886
Time (linear)
.25
.05
1886
Time (quadratic)
-.12
.02
1886
Time (cubic)
.01
.00
1886
Faith in Humanity
-.18
.06
313
Faith in Humanity X Time
-.01
.01
1886
Note. Estimates represent unstandardized coefficients.

t value
17.28
4.89
-5.94
5.59
-2.95
-.83

p value
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.40
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Table 12
Summary of the Cynicism Level 2 Model
Variable
Estimate
SE
df
t value
(Intercept)
3.52
.23
1935
14.75
Time (linear)
.24
.06
1935
4.13
Time (quadratic)
-.10
.02
1935
-4.85
Time (cubic)
.01
.00
1935
4.60
Cynicism
.13
.05
321
2.26
Cynicism X Time
-.07
.01
1934
-1.36
Note. Estimates represent unstandardized coefficients.

p value
.00
.00
.00
.00
.01
.18

94

EXAMINING SUSPICION OVER TIME

Table 13
Summary of the Automation Predictability Level 2 Model
Variable
Estimate
(Intercept)
4.03
Time (linear)
.21
Time (quadratic)
-.06
Time (cubic)
.01
Automation Pred.
.13
Automation Pred. X Time (linear)
.05
Automation Pred. X Time (quadratic)
-.07
Automation Pred. X Time (cubic)
.01
Note. Estimates represent unstandardized coefficients.

SE
.08
.07
.02
.00
.11
.11
.04
.00

df
2304
2304
2304
2304
383
2304
2304
2304

t value
49.02
2.78
-2.46
2.17
1.17
.52
-1.89
2.08

p value
.00
.00
.01
.03
.24
.60
.06
.03
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Table 14
Summary of the Tolerance for Ambiguity Level 2 Model
Variable
Estimate
(Intercept)
4.44
Time (linear)
-.50
Time (quadratic)
.15
Time (cubic)
-.01
Tolerance for Ambi.
-.07
Tolerance for Ambi. X Time (linear)
.19
Tolerance for Ambi. X Time (quadratic)
-.07
Tolerance for Ambi. X Time (cubic)
.01
Note. Estimates represent unstandardized coefficients.

SE
.35
.33
.12
.01
.08
.07
.03
.00

df
1944
1944
1944
1944
323
1944
1944
1944

t value
12.88
-1.55
1.33
-1.31
-.93
2.46
-2.39
2.32

p value
.00
.12
.18
.19
.35
.01
.02
.02
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Figure 1
Level 1 Growth Curve Model
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Figure 2
Interaction between General Mental Ability and Time on State Suspicion
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Figure 3
Interaction between Need for Cognition and Time on State Suspicion
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Figure 4
Interaction between Automation Predictability and Time on State Suspicion
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Figure 5
Interaction between Tolerance for Ambiguity and Time on State Suspicion
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Appendix A – List of Measures
Creativity
Citation
Goldberg, L. R., Johnson, J. A., Eber, H. W., Hogan, R., Ashton, M. C.,
Cloninger, C. R., & Gough, H. C. (2006). The International Personality Item Pool
and the future of public-domain personality measures. Journal of Research in
Personality, 40, 84-96.
Instructions
Please read the statements below and indicate to what degree you agree or
disagree that the statements describe you generally.
Response format
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Slightly disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Slightly agree
Agree
Strongly agree

Scoring
Reverse code the items the items marked with an R. Average all of the items.
Items
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

I am able to come up with new and different ideas.
I don't pride myself on being original. – R
I have an imagination that stretches beyond that of my friends.
I am an original thinker.
I am not considered to have new and different ideas. – R
I come up with new ways to do things.
I have no special urge to do something original. – R
I like to think of new ways to do things.

General Mental Ability
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Citation
Arthur, W., & Day, D. V. (1994). Development of a short form for the Raven
Advanced Progressive Matrices Test. Educational And Psychological
Measurement, 54(2), 394-403.
Instructions
The Advanced Progressive Matrices – Short Form is a measure of “observation
and clear thinking” (Raven, 1993). There are two test booklets labeled Set I and
Set II. Set I consists of two (2) practice items. Set II is the actual test and has 12
items.
Set I is intended to show you how the test works and also provide you with some
practice. Please turn to Item 1 of Set I. The top part of this item is a pattern with a
bit cut out of it. Look at the pattern and think about what the piece needed to
complete the pattern correctly both horizontally and vertically must be like. Then
find the right piece out of the eight bits shown below.
The correct answer for Item 1, Set I is #8; please record this on your answer sheet.
Now, complete the other practice item (i.e., Item 2) in Set I. You have 1 minute to
do this.
The correct answer for Item 2, Set I is #4.
Set II. After you have completed Set I, complete Set II in the same manner. Set II
is the actual test and has 12 items. Remember it is accurate work that counts.
Attempt each item in turn. Do your best to find the correct piece to complete it
before going on to the next problem.
If you get stuck, move on. However, when you move on you cannot return to
complete the item. Specifically, in completing this test, YOU CANNOT TURN
BACK TO PREVIOUS ITEMS. Also note that in every case, the next item is
harder, and it will take you longer to check your answer carefully.
You have 15 minutes to complete Set II.
Response format
Participants are presented with item one at a time. They are instructed to select
one of eight pieces that completes each figure. Once participants select an option
and move on, they cannot go back. Set I consists of two practice items and is not
scored. Set II consists of 12 scored items. The Set I expires after 1 minute, while
Set II expires after 15 minutes.
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Scoring
Item Number
Set I
1
2
Set II
1
4
8
11
15
18
21
23
25
30
31
35

Correct Answer
8
4
5
4
1
5
2
7
8
6
7
5
4
3

Items
Set I

Set II
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Need for Cognition
Citation
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Kao C. F., (1984). The Efficient Assessment of Need for
Cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48(3), 306.
Instructions
Please read the statements below and indicate to what degree they describe you generally.
Response format
7-point Likert scale. Response options:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Slightly disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Slightly agree
Agree
Strongly agree

Scoring
Reverse code the items the items marked with an R. Average all of the items.
Items
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems.
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of
thinking.
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. – R
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4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure
to challenge my thinking abilities. – R
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely chance I will have to
think in depth about something. – R
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and long for hours.
7. I only think as hard as I have to. – R
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long term ones. – R
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them. – R
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
12. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much. – R
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is
somewhat important but does not require much thought.
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of
mental effort. – R
17. It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it
works. – R
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me
personally.
Trait Trust
Citation
Mayer, R. C., & Davis, J. H. (1999). The effect of the performance appraisal system on
trust for management: A field quasi-experiment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84(1),
123–136. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.84.1.123
Instructions
Please mark the number that best reflects the extent to which each statement describes
you.
Response format
7-point Likert scale. Response options:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Slightly disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Slightly agree
Agree
Strongly agree
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Scoring
Reverse code the items the items marked with an R. Average all of the items.
Items
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

One should be very cautious with strangers. – R
Most experts tell the truth within the limits of their knowledge.
Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do.
These days, you must be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you. – R
Most salespeople are honest about describing their products.
Most repair people will not overcharge people who are ignorant of their specialty.
Most people answer public opinion polls honestly.
Most adults are competent at their jobs.

Trait Suspicion – Suspicion Propensity Index, Situational-Based Test
Citation
Odle-Dusseau, H., & Bobko, P. (2015). Preliminary Report on the Development and
Psychometric Analysis of the Suspicion Propensity Index (SPI). Technical report.
Instructions
Please read the statements below and indicate to what degree they describe you generally.
Response format
Based on this situation, please indicate how accurately each of the following statements
describes you. Response options:
1. Not at all accurate
2. Minimally accurate
3. Somewhat accurate or disagree
4. Accurate
5. Very accurate
Scoring
Sum all items for “uncertainty/mal-intent” and “uncertainty/cognitive activity for total
suspicion score.
Items
Scenario 1.
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Very accurate

Somewhat accurate
or Disagree

Somewhat accurate
or Disagree
Accurate

Accurate

Minimally accurate
Minimally accurate

Based on this situation, please indicate how accurately
each of the following statements describes you:

Not at all accurate

Imagine you have applied for a job, for which you are
qualified, and have gone through the interview process.
Shortly after the interview, you receive notification that
the company decided to offer the job to another
individual.

Not at all accurate
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Scenario 2.
Imagine that you see a discussion on a social networking
website indicating that several of your friends got
together this past weekend, and they didn’t contact you
about joining them.
Based on this situation, please indicate how accurately
each of the following statements describes you:
a. I would be certain that my friends purposefully
excluded me, and I would do something such as
refuse to continue socially interacting with them.
(high agreement indicates paranoia)
b. I would not dwell on it, and instead focus my
thoughts on something else. (high agreement
indicates trust)
c. I would search for more information and reasons
as to why they might have gotten together and not
contact me (such as an invitation by someone I’m

110

Very accurate

a. I would decide to move on and continue
searching for a job. (high agreement indicates
trust)
b. I would follow up with someone at the company
and request more information about why I wasn’t
chosen. (high agreement indicates uncertainty
and cognitive activity)
c. I would be certain that someone I was in contact
with during the process must not like me, and I
would do something such as let others know they
should avoid this company. (high agreement
indicates paranoia)
d. I would wonder if there was someone at the
company who I had contact with who purposely
wanted to keep me from getting the job. (high
agreement indicates uncertainty and perceived
malintent)
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Minimally accurate

Somewhat accurate
or Disagree
Accurate

Very accurate

Minimally accurate

Somewhat accurate
or Disagree
Accurate

Very accurate

Based on this situation, please indicate how accurately
each of the following statements describes you:

Not at all accurate

Scenario 3.
Imagine you are interested in buying a new car, and are
in a car showroom. After telling a salesperson you are
interested in a mid-level model, he says, “In the long
run, a high-end model with the extra options is a better
investment.”

Not at all accurate

not friends with). (high agreement indicates
uncertainty and cognitive activity)
d. I would wonder if one of them excluded me on
purpose. (high agreement indicates uncertainty
and perceived malintent)

a. I would look around and listen to see if other
customers were receiving the same advice
from the salespeople. (high agreement
indicates uncertainty and cognitive activity)
b. I would wonder if the salesperson was only
interested in the potential increase in the
commission from the sale. (high agreement
indicates uncertainty and perceived
malintent)
c. I would be certain that the salesperson is not
truly trying to help me, and I would do
something such as leave and never return to
that dealership. (high agreement indicates
paranoia)
d. I would accept the help – it’s always nice to
have an expert opinion. (high agreement
indicates trust)
Scenario 4.
Imagine you enter a contest for a local school’s
fundraiser to guess the number of marbles in a large jar.
The prize is a $100 gift card to a popular online store.
After making your best guess, you find out the following
week that you did not win and that one of the teachers at
the school won the contest.
Based on this situation, please indicate how accurately
each of the following statements describes you:
a. I would wonder if the teacher who won had
cheated and/or had gotten inside information on
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Very accurate

Somewhat accurate
or Disagree
Accurate

Based on this situation, please indicate how accurately
each of the following statements describes you:
a. I would assume he is tired and probably just
didn’t feel like stopping to talk to me. (high
agreement indicates trust)
b. I would wonder what he might be hiding from me.
(high agreement indicates uncertainty and
perceived malintent)
c. I would be certain that he is hiding something
from me, and I would do something such as
taking away his driving privileges without
discussing it further with him. (high agreement
indicates paranoia)
d. I would go to his room and attempt to find out
what might be wrong. (high agreement indicates
uncertainty and cognitive activity)
Scenario 6.

Minimally accurate

Scenario 5.
Imagine that you have a teenage son. He comes home a
half hour before curfew and heads straight to his room
without stopping to talk to you. In the past he always
has checked in with you when arriving home, and he has
never returned home before curfew.

Not at all accurate

this activity. (high agreement indicates
uncertainty and perceived malintent)
b. I would accept another person winning – better
luck next time. (high agreement indicates trust)
c. I would think about flaws in my own thinking
(e.g., flaws in how I came up with my estimate)
that might explain why I didn’t win. (high
agreement indicates uncertainty and cognitive
activity)
d. I would be certain that the contest was rigged,
and I would do something such as never
participate in that school’s fundraisers again.
(high agreement indicates paranoia)

Minimally accurate

Somewhat accurate
or Disagree
Accurate

Very accurate

Somewhat accurate
or Disagree
Accurate

Very accurate

Based on this situation, please indicate how accurately
each of the following statements describes you:
a. I would try to get more information (e.g., Did
coworkers get their raises on time? Is the
company doing okay financially?) (high
agreement indicates uncertainty and cognitive
activity)
b. I would be certain that my supervisor is trying to
avoid paying me the raise I deserve, and I would
do something such as consider quitting. (high
agreement indicates paranoia)

Minimally accurate

Based on this situation, please indicate how accurately
each of the following statements describe you:
a. I would be certain that the lack of email
confirmation meant that I had lost the money, and
I would do something such as immediately cancel
my credit card or not shop online in the future.
(high agreement indicates paranoia)
b. I would try to email the company to determine if
the purchase was confirmed, and I would attempt
to find out more information about the company.
(high agreement indicates uncertainty and
cognitive activity)
c. I would wonder if there was any danger in
providing my credit card information. (high
agreement indicates uncertainty and perceived
malintent)
d. I would wait a few days to see if the confirmation
is delivered as the website promised. (high
agreement indicates trust)
Scenario 7.
Imagine you start working for a new company and are
told by your supervisor that you will receive a raise
within the first 3 months. After 5 months, you haven’t
received a raise. When you ask, your supervisor keeps
telling you “we’re working on it.”

Not at all accurate

Imagine you have just visited an online store to shop for
a book you want to purchase. After finding the book you
want on a discount website that you haven’t heard of
before, you decide to go ahead and purchase the book.
After entering your credit card information and clicking
the “confirm purchase” button, you wait for an email
confirmation of your purchase. However, the email
confirmation never arrives.

Not at all accurate
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Minimally accurate

Somewhat accurate
or Disagree
Accurate

Very accurate

Somewhat accurate
or Disagree
Accurate

Very accurate

Based on this situation, please indicate how accurately
each of the following statements describes you:
a. His story seems legit, and I would look to see if I
have any money I could spare. (high agreement
indicates trust)
b. I would be certain that this person is conning me,
and I would do something such as call the police
or quickly walk away from him. (high agreement
indicates paranoia)

Minimally accurate

Based on this situation, please indicate how accurately
each of the following statements describes you:
a. I would wonder if the person is there to take
advantage of me in some way. (high agreement
indicates uncertainty and perceived malintent)
b. I would be certain that this is a solicitation that I
did not want, and I would do something such as
keep quiet and not even answer the door. (high
agreement indicates paranoia)
c. I would open the door and invite the person
inside my home. (high agreement indicates trust)
d. I would answer the door and ask questions to
determine why the person is there. (high
agreement indicates uncertainty and cognitive
activity)
Scenario 9.
Imagine you have pulled off an interstate to stop for gas
at a gas station. You are approached by a male asking
for money. He tells you his car broke down, and he and
his spouse are on their way to a family member’s
funeral.

Not at all accurate

Scenario 8.
Imagine one afternoon you are home and your doorbell
rings. You aren’t expecting anyone, and you look
through the peephole in your door. The person, who you
don’t recognize, is carrying pamphlets, a clipboard, and
a box.

Not at all accurate

c. I would not worry. I was told I would get a raise
so one will happen soon. (high agreement
indicates trust)
d. I would wonder if my supervisor was trying to
take advantage of me. (high agreement indicates
uncertainty and perceived malintent)
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Minimally
accurate
Somewhat
accurate
or Disagree
Accurate

Very accurate

Minimally
accurate
Somewhat
accurate
or Disagree
Accurate

Very accurate

Based on this situation, please indicate how accurately
each of the following statements describes you:
a. I would be certain that there is something very
wrong, and I would do something such as
immediately shut the computer down without
completing my search. (high agreement indicates
paranoia)
b. I would worry that someone is trying to hack into
my computer to cause me harm. (high agreement
indicates uncertainty and perceived malintent)
c. I would keep working on the search – it’s likely
nothing to be concerned about. (high agreement
indicates trust)
d. I would try to think of reasons the computer could
be running slow. (high agreement indicates
uncertainty and cognitive activity)
Scenario 11.
Imagine you are at a convenience store and you need to
pay your bill. The charge for your items is $20.57, and
you give $30 in cash to the attendant. The change you
receive from the attendant doesn’t seem like enough.
Based on this situation, please indicate how accurately
each of the following statements describes you:
a. I would wonder if maybe an error was made on
purpose. (high agreement indicates uncertainty
and perceived malintent)
b. I would not count my change, and I would believe
it was actually correct. (high agreement
indicates trust)
c. I would think about possible reasons that a
mistake might have been made. (high agreement
indicates uncertainty and cognitive activity)

Not at all
accurate

c. I would wonder if the person is lying to take
advantage of me. (high agreement indicates
uncertainty and perceived malintent)
d. I would ask him questions to try to determine if
his story was accurate or what it might really be.
(high agreement indicates uncertainty and
cognitive activity)
Scenario 10.
Imagine you are using your computer for a search on a
topic of interest. You soon notice that your computer is
running slower than normal.

Not at all
accurate
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d. I would be certain that the change was wrong
and that the attendant is like all cashiers – who
always try to short-change customers – and I
would immediately count my change in front of
him. (high agreement indicates paranoia)
Trait Suspicion – Suspicion Propensity Index, Global Trait Items
Citation
Odle-Dusseau, H., & Bobko, P. (2015). Preliminary Report on the Development and
Psychometric Analysis of the Suspicion Propensity Index (SPI). Technical report.
Instructions
Please read the statements below and indicate to what degree they describe you generally.
Response format
5-point Likert scale. Response options:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

Scoring
Average all of the items.
Items
1. I often wonder if salespeople are only interested in their sales commissions.
2. I am naturally suspicious.
3. I generally am careful to think through social interactions with others – you
never know what someone is really trying to do to you.
4. When I use technology that is new to me, I am on the lookout for ways in
which I might get intentionally harmed by the technology.
5. Most people only tell you what they want you to hear, so they can manipulate
you.
6. In business situations, people generally behave to take advantage of others.
7. When I see a person acting strangely, I try to think of different ways to
explain that person's behavior.
8. So that I can detect unusual things, I try to be aware of what is happening
around me.
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Faith in Humanity
Citation
Li, X., Hess, T. J., & Valacich, J. S. (2008). Why do we trust new technology? A study of
initial trust formation with organizational information systems. Journal Of Strategic
Information Systems, 17(1), 39-71.
Instructions
Please read the statements below and indicate to what degree they describe you generally.
Response format
7-point Likert scale. Response options:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Scoring

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Slightly disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Slightly agree
Agree
Strongly agree

Average all of the items.
Items
1. In general, people really do care about the well-being of others.
2. The typical person is sincerely concerned about the problems of others.
3. Most of the time, people care enough to try to be helpful, rather than just
looking out for themselves.
4. I believe that most professional people do a very good job at their work.
5. Most professionals are very knowledgeable in their chosen field.
6. A large majority of professional people is competent in their area of expertise.
7. In general, most folks keep their promises.
8. I think people generally try to back up their words with their actions.
9. Most people are honest in their dealings with others.
Cynicism
Citation
Kanter, D. L., & Mirvis, P. H. (1989). The cynical Americans: Living and working in an
age of discontent and disillusion. San Francisco, CA US: Jossey-Bass.
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Instructions
Read the following scenes. If this happened to you, how much ill will would you feel the
people in each scene has towards you?
Response format
7-point Likert scale. Response options:
1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Slightly disagree
4. Neither agree nor disagree
5. Slightly agree
6. Agree
7. Strongly agree
Scoring
Average all of the items.
Items
1. Most people will tell a lie if they can gain by it.
2. People claim to have ethical standards, but few stick to them when money is at
stake.
3. People pretend to care more about one another than they really do.
4. It’s pathetic to see an unselfish person in today’s world because so many people
will take advantage of him or her.
5. Most people are just out for themselves.
6. Most people inwardly dislike putting themselves out to help others.
7. Most people are not really honest by nature.
Tolerance for Ambiguity
Citation
McLain, D.L. (1993). The MSTAT-1: A new measure of an individual’s tolerance for
ambiguity. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 53, 183-189.
Instructions
Please read the statements below and indicate to what degree you agree or disagree.
Response format
7-point Likert scale. Response options:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Slightly disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Slightly agree
Agree
Strongly agree

Scoring
Reverse code the items the items marked with an R. Average all of the items.
Items
1. I don't tolerate ambiguous situations well. – R
2. I don't think new situations are any more threatening than familiar situations.
3. I try to avoid situations which are ambiguous. – R
4. I prefer familiar situations to new ones. - R
5. I avoid situations that are too complicated for me to understand. – R
6. I am tolerant of ambiguous situations.
7. I enjoy tackling problems which are complex enough to be ambiguous.
8. I try to avoid problems which don't see, to have only one "best" solution. – R
9. I dislike ambiguous situations. – R
10. I prefer a situation in which there is some ambiguity.
State Suspicion – Self Reported (Bobko)
Citation
Bobko, P. Barelka, A., & Hirshfield, L. (2014). Invited article: The construct of
suspicion and how it can benefit theories and models in organizational science. Under
review at the Journal of Business and Psychology, 29(3), 335-342.
Instructions
Please read each statement below and indicate how well it describes your experience with
the task you just completed.
Response format
7-point Likert scale. Response options:
1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Slightly disagree
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4.
5.
6.
7.

Neither agree nor disagree
Slightly agree
Agree
Strongly agree

Scoring
Two possible scoring methods:
1) Reverse code the items the items marked with an R. Combine (standardized, unit
weights) within their suspicion facet: malintent (MI), cognitive activity (CA), and
uncertainty (U). Compute MIxCAxU and combine this score with the suspicion
(S) items. This method accounts for the three-way interaction discussed by
Bobko.
2) Reverse code the items the items marked with an R. Average all of the items.
This method yields a general suspicion score.
Items
1. I wasn’t sure if the Automated Aide was giving me completely accurate
information. (U)
2. At several points when the Automated Aide was giving me a recommendation, I
wondered what was really going on behind the scenes of that system. (CA)
3. I tended to believe the Automated Aide was honest with me. (MI) – R
4. I was on my guard when interacting with the Automated Aide. (S)
5. When the Automated Aide was giving me a recommendation, I was uncertain as
to what was really going on with the system. (U)
6. I kept thinking that some information I was given by the Automated Aide was
unusual. (CA)
7. I had confidence in the integrity of the Automated Aide. (MI) – R
8. I was suspicious of the Automated Aide during the session. (S)
9. While interacting with the Automated Aide, I was uncertain as to what would
eventually happen. (U)
10. I spent time thinking of alternative possibilities about what was going on while
interacting with the Automated Aide. (CA)
11. I felt like I was intentionally being misled by the Automated Aide. (MI)
12. I was not suspicious about what the Automated Aide was presenting to me. (S) –
R
13. It was clear what was going on at all times while interacting with the Automated
Aide. (U) – R
14. There were many times when I found myself wondering about the information
being provided by the Automated Aide. (CA)
15. I was very concerned about some of the things suggested to me by the Automated
Aide. (MI)
16. I became increasingly suspicious during my interactions with the Automated
Aide. (S)
17. Nothing seemed unusual about my interactions with the Automated Aide. (U) – R
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18. I believed the Automated Aide wouldn’t withhold any information I needed to
make a good decision. (MI) – R
19. I was not suspicious of anything during my interactions with the Automated Aide.
(S) – R
20. I felt that the Automated Aide was up front with me regarding the information it
presented. (MI) – R
Workload
Citation
NASA (1986). Nasa Task Load Index (TLX) v. 1.0 Manual.
Instructions
Please read each statement below and indicate how well it describes your experience with the
task you just completed.
Response format
7-point Likert scale. Response options:
1. Very low
2. Low
3. Slightly low
4. Neither high nor low
5. Slightly high
6. High
7. Very high
Scoring
Reverse code the items the items marked with an R. Average all of the items.
Items
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

How mentally demanding was the task?
How hurried or rushed was the pace of the task?
How successful were you in accomplishing what you were asked to do? - R
How hard did you have to work to accomplish your level of performance?
How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed, and annoyed were you?
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Appendix B – Dissertation Main Task Instructions
Hi Cognitive Load – Comp Participant Goals – Hi/Lo Automation Predictability
In today’s laboratory session, you will participate in a competitive automation monitoring task.
You will be presented with a series of multiplication problems (e.g., 30 X 4) and your job will be
to decide whether a computer assistant gives you the correct answer.
Also as part of this task you will be asked to remember short 5-digit strings of numbers (e.g.,
51698).
You may not use any extra materials (e.g., calculator, paper and pen) to help you reach this
decision, you may only use your brain.
There are two types of computer assistants. One type gives correct answers most of the time,
while the other gives correct answers much less often.
The quality of the automated aide you will use will be randomly determined by another person in
the room today. Half of the participants in today's session will get to choose the quality of
another person's aide, as well as their own.
You will earn a point of every correct answer you get. The person with the most points in today’s
session will be entered into a drawing to win one of several Amazon gift cards valued up to
$100.
Lo Cognitive Load – Comp Participant Goals – Hi/Lo Automation Predictability
In today’s laboratory session, you will participate in a competitive automation monitoring task.
You will be presented with a series of multiplication problems (e.g., 30 X 4) and your job will be
to decide whether a computer assistant gives you the correct answer.
You may not use any extra materials (e.g., calculator, paper and pen) to help you reach this
decision, you may only use your brain.
There are two types of computer assistants. One type gives correct answers most of the time,
while the other gives correct answers much less often.
The quality of the automated aide you will use will be randomly determined by another person in
the room today. Half of the participants in today's session will get to choose the quality of
another person's aide, as well as their own.
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You will earn a point of every correct answer you get. The person with the most points in today’s
session will be entered into a drawing to win one of several Amazon gift cards valued up to
$100.
Hi Cognitive Load – Coop Participant Goals – Hi/Lo Automation Predictability
In today’s laboratory session, you will participate in a cooperative automation monitoring task.
You will be presented with a series of multiplication problems (e.g., 30 X 4) and your job will be
to decide whether a computer assistant gives you the correct answer.
Also as part of this task you will be asked to remember short 5-digit strings of numbers (e.g.,
51698).
You may not use any extra materials (e.g., calculator, paper and pen) to help you reach this
decision, you may only use your brain.
There are two types of computer assistants. One type gives correct answers most of the time,
while the other gives correct answers much less often.
The quality of the automated aide you will use will be randomly determined by another person in
the room today. Half of the participants in today's session will get to choose the quality of
another person's aide, as well as their own.
You will earn a point of every correct answer you get. Everyone who earns 80% of the points in
today’s session will be entered into a drawing to win one of several Amazon gift cards valued up
to $100.
Lo Cognitive Load – Coop Participant Goals – Hi/Lo Automation Predictability
In today’s laboratory session, you will participate in a cooperative automation monitoring task.
You will be presented with a series of multiplication problems (e.g., 30 X 4) and your job will be
to decide whether a computer assistant gives you the correct answer.
You may not use any extra materials (e.g., calculator, paper and pen) to help you reach this
decision, you may only use your brain.
There are two types of computer assistants. One type gives correct answers most of the time,
while the other gives correct answers much less often.
The quality of the automated aide you will use will be randomly determined by another person in
the room today. Half of the participants in today's session will get to choose the quality of
another person's aide, as well as their own.
You will earn a point of every correct answer you get. Everyone who earns 80% of the points in
today’s session will be entered into a drawing to win one of several Amazon gift cards valued up
to $100.
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Appendix C – List of Main Task Items by Condition

Training

Block 1

Block 2

Block 3

Item
#

Item
Text

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q6
Q7
Q8
Q9
Q10
Q11
Q12
Q13
Q14
Q15
Q16
Q17
Q18
Q19
Q20
Q21
Q22
Q23
Q24
Q25
Q26
Q27
Q28
Q29
Q30
Q31
Q32
Q33
Q34
Q35
Q36

16 X 9
58 X 9
42 X 2
37 X 8
60 X 3
98 X 4
76 X 5
38 X 2
99 X 7
85 X 8
67 X 9
66 X 6
16 X 3
34 X 7
27 X 3
48 X 4
57 X 6
64 X 5
68 X 8
89 X 2
25 X 8
73 X 9
72 X 6
22 X 2
57 X 7
14 X 3
22 X 3
84 X 7
50 X 6
68 X 8
61 X 4
87 X 7
12 X 9
34 X 5
18 X 2
60 X 6

Lo-Pred.
Automation
Response
114
522
84
288
180
392
380
76
693
680
603
396
36
252
81
192
342
310
560
178
184
657
432
44
406
42
63
588
300
552
252
609
126
170
34
360

Lo-Pred.
Automation
Accuracy
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1

Hi-Pred.
Automation
Response
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
585
396
48
238
81
192
342
320
544
178
200
657
432
46
399
42
66
588
300
544
244
609
108
170
36
360

Hi-Pred.
Automation
Accuracy
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Hi-Cog.
Demand 5digit recall
72005
95301
22539
13290
81930
48841
64669
34925
57178
48853
11761
38464
39650
11909
80542
14918
93786
77029
47118
87683
77501
49926
53422
89103
64872
36880
39776
51912
60575
28741
81579
88380
74193
68963
48425
79044
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Block 4

Block 5

Block 6

Block 7

Q37
Q38
Q39
Q40
Q41
Q42
Q43
Q44
Q45
Q46
Q47
Q48
Q49
Q50
Q51
Q52
Q53
Q54
Q55
Q56
Q57
Q58
Q59
Q60
Q61
Q62
Q63
Q64
Q65
Q66
Q67
Q68
Q69
Q70
Q71
Q72
Q73
Q74
Q75
Q76
Q77
Q78
Q79
Q80

44 X 3
82 X 3
86 X 8
64 X 6
54 X 9
25 X 4
13 X 6
47 X 3
83 X 6
98 X 9
24 X 3
11 X 9
16 X 4
68 X 7
55 X 4
51 X 8
25 X 2
64 X 4
57 X 9
74 X 9
58 X 7
24 X 3
78 X 5
52 X 5
35 X 6
78 X 3
64 X 3
27 X 9
93 X 8
31 X 3
61 X 4
87 X 3
62 X 7
36 X 5
75 X 3
20 X 3
39 X 6
25 X 7
25 X 6
53 X 3
78 X 9
14 X 3
62 X 2
56 X 5

132
246
688
372
486
108
78
141
504
873
72
99
56
476
228
408
54
256
504
666
392
72
390
260
198
237
192
225
760
93
244
261
434
180
228
57
234
175
150
156
702
42
124
285

1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0

132
240
688
384
486
100
72
141
498
882
72
99
64
476
220
408
50
256
513
666
406
72
390
265
210
234
192
243
744
93
240
261
434
180
225
63
234
175
150
159
702
42
124
280

1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

24780
58770
18561
81483
65342
11855
67714
29887
41116
60414
76258
85646
33172
24734
92077
42503
84045
82850
63238
58680
23065
34558
56368
38228
53884
58713
15028
61050
79659
77096
39014
67333
39255
51461
86595
91683
24760
39697
20489
99387
26750
92296
92823
78971
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Notes. Lo-Pred. = low automation predictability condition (60% accuracy). Hi-Pred. =
high automation predictability condition (90% accuracy). Automation Accuracy =
whether the automated aide gives
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Appendix D – Summary of the Workload Level 2 Model

Estimate
SE
df
Variable
3.12
.18
2306
(Intercept)
.28
.06
2306
Time (linear)
-.12
.01
2306
Time (quadratic)
.01
.00
2306
Time (cubic)
Workload
.24
.04
383
-.01
.01
2306
Workload X Time (linear)
Note. Estimates represent unstandardized coefficients.

t value
16.85
4.71
-6.60
6.05
5.56
-.62

p value
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.53
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Appendix E – Summary of the Task Performance Level 2 Model

Variable

Estimate
SE
(Intercept)
5.68
.18
Time (linear)
.02
.07
Time (quadratic)
-.07
.01
Time (cubic)
.01
.00
Task Performance
-.17
.01
Task Performance X Time (linear)
.01
.00
Note. Estimates represent unstandardized coefficients.

df
2305
2305
2305
2305
2305
2305

t value
31.49
.34
-.41
3.94
-9.10
2.26

p value
.00
.73
.00
.00
.00
.02
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Appendix F – Interaction between Need for Cognition and Time and time on State Suspicion
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Appendix G – Summary of the Time on Task Level 2 Model

Variable

Estimate
SE
(Intercept)
3.834
.131
Time (linear)
.151
.139
Time (quadratic)
- .035
.049
Time (cubic)
.002
.005
Time on Task
.002
.001
Time on Task X Time (linear)
.002
.001
Time on Task X Time (quadratic)
-.001
.001
Time on Task X Time (cubic)
.001
.000
Note. Estimates represent unstandardized coefficients.

df
2303
2303
2303
2303
2303
2303
2303
2303

t value
29.06
1.08
-.71
.40
2.27
1.77
-2.33
2.34

p value
.00
.27
.47
.68
.02
.07
.01
.01
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Appendix H – Interaction between Time on Task and Time on State Suspicion
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Appendix I – State Suspicion Sub-Component Inter-Correlations and Reliabilities
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Appendix J – State Suspicion Sub-Component Correlations
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